Law Centres Federation Limited (t/a Law Centres Network), R (On the Application Of) v The Lord Chancellor

A public decision-maker must make reasonable inquiries into a relevant factor before adopting it as the foundation for a policy decision. Assumptions, conjecture or limited anecdotal evidence cannot establish a significant problem where the available material does not support it. The public sector equality duty requires a personal and rigorous consideration of the likely equality consequences of the decision. Consultation responses do not replace the decision-maker’s own inquiries. An equality impact assessment is not mandatory, but its absence may make compliance harder to demonstrate. Where these duties are breached and the decision might have been different, the usual remedy is to quash the decision and remit it for reconsideration.

The claimant, the national body for Law Centres, challenged two decisions by the Lord Chancellor concerning Legal Aid-funded Housing Possession Court Duty schemes. The first decision reduced more than 100 scheme areas to 47 and introduced price-competitive tendering. The second initiated procurement by publishing tender documents.

The claimant argued that the decisions were based on an unsubstantiated assumption that larger schemes would be more sustainable and that the Lord Chancellor had failed to comply with the public sector equality duty in section 149 of the Equality Act 2010. The central issues were whether sufficient inquiry had been made into financial viability and whether the equality implications had been properly considered.

1. Tameside duty and irrationality. The Lord Chancellor had selected viability or sustainability as a relevant consideration but had not obtained sufficient information to establish that existing small schemes were economically unsustainable or that larger contracts would improve sustainability. The evidence showed provider withdrawals, but did not establish their reasons or demonstrate a connection between scheme size and financial viability. No financial modelling or comparable inquiry was undertaken before the decisions.
2. The proposed use of agents also undermined the stated rationale. The additional income from larger contracts would be divided between principal providers and agents, while larger areas could increase travel, administrative and staffing costs. The conclusion that larger schemes would be more attractive was therefore an assumption that required investigation. The decisions were ones that no reasonable decision-maker could reach on the evidence gathered, and the Tameside duty of inquiry was breached.
3. Public sector equality duty. The duty under section 149 of the Equality Act 2010 was personal to the decision-maker and required a conscious, rigorous and substantive focus on the statutory equality criteria and the potential impact of the proposals. The Lord Chancellor had not been adequately informed about the likely effect on users with protected characteristics of losing access to local Law Centre and wrap-around services. The possibility of agency arrangements did not answer those concerns, since agency use was not compulsory and could not cure every identified impact.
4. An equality impact assessment was not legally compulsory and would not itself establish compliance. However, the available ministerial submissions and consultation material did not demonstrate that the relevant Minister had personally given due regard to the equality implications. Both grounds succeeded.
5. The decisions were quashed and the matter remitted to the Lord Chancellor for reconsideration. Declaratory relief alone was inappropriate, and the administrative inconvenience caused by quashing did not justify withholding the normal remedy.