Summers v London Borough of Richmond Upon Thames

A local authority has a broad judgment under Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014, section 59, when deciding which activities in public places have a detrimental effect and what controls are reasonable. The court’s role is supervisory, applying ordinary Wednesbury review at a standard level of scrutiny. A PSPO may address dog-walking generally, with particular restrictions forming part of that wider regulatory scheme. The authority must nevertheless have evidence reasonably supporting each prohibition or requirement. A four-dog limit and a definition of proper control were reasonable on the evidence. Requirements prohibiting dogs from causing annoyance or damage to council property were quashed where the evidence did not justify them.

The applicant, a Richmond resident and dog owner, sought statutory review under section 66 of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 of a Public Spaces Protection Order made by the respondent borough council on 16 October 2017.

The challenge concerned a four-dog limit in Article 5, aspects of Article 6 concerning proper control, annoyance and damage, and exemptions for assistance dogs. The central questions were whether the council had acted within section 59, whether its decisions were reasonable on supervisory review, and whether the High Court had jurisdiction under section 66 to determine alleged discrimination contrary to section 29 of the Equality Act 2010.

1. Scope and standard of review. Section 66 provides a supervisory jurisdiction analogous to judicial review. A legality challenge engages rationality, while procedural impropriety falls within the separate procedural ground. The appropriate scrutiny was the standard Wednesbury level, expressed by the question whether a reasonable decision-maker could have reached the decision. (paras [32]–[39])
2. Section 59 framework. “Activities” for section 59 purposes could properly be understood as dog-walking generally. The four-dog limit and the proper-control requirements were particular aspects of the wider control of dog-walking in public spaces. Section 59(3)(c) requires a proportionality cross-check, reinforced by the reasonableness requirement in section 59(5). Local authorities retain judgment as to local conditions and competing interests, but must have evidence capable of supporting the specific controls imposed. (paras [23]–[30], [54]–[55])
3. Article 5. The four-dog limit was reasonable under section 59(5). The council had evidence concerning increased commercial dog-walking, residents’ complaints, survey results, professional guidance and concerns about large groups of dogs. The court was not deciding whether the council had chosen the best or most logical solution, but only whether its decision was reasonable on the evidence. The licensing scheme and proposed twelve-month review were relevant. (paras [56]–[61])
4. Article 6. Defining “proper control” by reference to leads, muzzles, proximity and response to commands was reasonable. The flexible penalty regime allowed minor lapses to be dealt with proportionately. Paragraphs (b) and (c), prohibiting annoyance and damage to council property, were quashed. The evidence relied on either concerned dogs being out of control, already covered by paragraph (a), or did not identify specific damage by an individual dog sufficient to justify the additional requirements. (paras [62]–[64])
5. Equality and standing. The applicant was an “interested person” and therefore had standing to raise any ground falling within section 66. However, the High Court had no jurisdiction in this statutory review to determine a claim under section 29 of the Equality Act 2010, which had to be brought in the county court under sections 113 and 114. No properly pleaded case based on the public sector equality duty under section 149 had been made. (paras [67]–[89])
6. Order. Paragraphs (b) and (c) of Article 6 were quashed. The remainder of the application was dismissed. (para [90])

First-instance statutory review under section 66 of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014. No prior decision is stated in the judgment.