Trustees of Swansea University Pension and Assurance Scheme v Williams

Key principle: Section 15(1) of the Equality Act 2010 must be applied by identifying the relevant treatment and asking whether that treatment was "unfavourable" to the claimant; the provision does not require a comparator. The expression "treats ... unfavourably" is to be assessed by reference to whether the treatment is adverse or disadvantaging in an objective sense, allowing for a relatively low threshold of disadvantage but not importing hypothetical comparisons with different disabilities.

The Court held that the relevant treatment was the award of an immediate ill‑health pension and enhancements under the scheme. That award was not, on its face, unfavourable: the pension and enhancement were conferred (without actuarial reduction) and were not reasonably to be regarded as adverse treatment. The claimant’s complaint, which depended on comparing the calculation method with hypothetical treatment of persons with different medical histories, did not amount to unfavourable treatment within section 15(1)(a). Accordingly the claim failed.

Background and facts:

• Mr Williams was employed by the respondent university from 2000 until ill‑health retirement on 30 June 2013. He has Tourette’s syndrome and other conditions within the definition of "disability" (section 6 of the Equality Act 2010).
• During his employment he moved from full‑time to part‑time hours as reasonable adjustments. The scheme changed in 2009 from final salary to CARE for accrual after 1 August 2009. On his IHR he received an immediate lump sum and annuity based on actual (part‑time) salary and an enhancement (the "enhanced element") calculated by reference to his salary at retirement and deemed pensionable service to normal pension date.

Nature of the claim / relief sought: A claim of disability discrimination under section 15(1) of the Equality Act 2010, challenging the calculation of the enhanced element of his pension as amounting to discrimination arising from disability. Relief sought: Not stated in the judgment.

Procedural history: The Employment Tribunal upheld Mr Williams’ claim; the Employment Appeal Tribunal (Langstaff J) reversed [2015] ICR 1197; the Court of Appeal dismissed his appeal ([2017] EWCA Civ 1008; [2018] ICR 233). The claim was then before the Supreme Court on the meaning of "treats ... unfavourably" in section 15(1).

Issues framed:

• What is the meaning and test for "treats ... unfavourably" under section 15(1) of the Equality Act 2010?
• Whether the calculation of the enhanced element by reference to part‑time salary, stemming from disability‑related reduced hours, amounted to unfavourable treatment.

Court’s reasoning: The court emphasised that section 15 removes the comparator requirement present under earlier law but that it remains necessary to identify the relevant "treatment". In this case the treatment was the award of the pension and enhancement. Although guidance in the Code of Practice indicates a low threshold of disadvantage, the award here was not adverse: it conferred immediate, unreduced pension benefits which were not reasonably to be regarded as unfavourable. The claimant’s argument depended on comparing outcomes with those suffering different disabilities or medical histories, which is not the correct approach under section 15. The court concluded the undisputed facts could not amount to unfavourable treatment and dismissed the appeal.

Wider context: The court noted that section 15 was intended to address the effect of the House of Lords’ decision in Lewisham LBC v Malcolm but held that interpretation should proceed from the text of section 15 itself. The Code of Practice was helpful on the low threshold of disadvantage but did not alter the objective assessment required in this case.

Appeal dismissed. The Supreme Court held that, for the purposes of section 15(1) Equality Act 2010, the relevant treatment was the award of the ill‑health pension and enhancement; that award was not "unfavourable" in an objective sense. The claimant’s argument depended on an improper comparison with persons with different medical histories, and on an artificial separation of calculation method from the award itself; consequently the facts could not establish discrimination arising from disability under section 15(1)(a).

Employment Tribunal: claim accepted for the appellant (details in the judgment). Employment Appeal Tribunal: appeal allowed, decision of Langstaff J [2015] ICR 1197. Court of Appeal: appeal dismissed ([2017] EWCA Civ 1008; reported [2018] ICR 233). Supreme Court: appeal dismissed [2018] UKSC 65.