The Secretary of State for Work and Pensions v Hockley & Anor

For the purposes of regulation B13(5) of the Housing Benefit Regulations 2006, “bedroom” is construed objectively in its statutory context and in light of the scheme’s purpose. The assessment concerns the property in a notionally vacant state and is depersonalised. A room must be capable of use as a bedroom by any listed category of person, rather than by the particular claimant or family occupying it. Actual use of rooms and the occupants’ individual needs cannot change the property’s objective classification. The appeal was allowed and the claimant was treated as entitled to a two-bedroom property.

The Secretary of State appealed against the Upper Tribunal’s decision in [2017] UKUT 471 (AAC) concerning the meaning of “bedroom” in regulation B13(5) of the Housing Benefit Regulations 2006. The claimant lived with her husband and two sons in a property described as having three bedrooms. The two smaller rooms could not accommodate two children sharing, and the application of the regulation reduced the family’s housing benefit.

The Upper Tribunal held that bedroom entitlement depended on whether a room could be used by the actual occupants or relevant class of occupants. The central issue before the Court of Appeal was whether regulation B13(5) required that connection with the particular occupants.

1. Appeal allowed. The Upper Tribunal’s decision was quashed. The claimant was entitled to a two-bedroom property for the purposes of regulation B13.
2. The regulations constitute a social-policy scheme for calculating housing-benefit entitlement and applying any cap. They do not provide entitlement to a particular form of physical housing. The bedroom criteria operate as a proxy for need and quantify cash entitlement.
3. “Bedroom” is an ordinary word, undefined and unqualified in the regulations. It must be construed in context and in light of the statutory purposes, including the effective use of social housing, reducing mismatches and overcrowding, encouraging mobility and containing expenditure.
4. The assessment under regulation B13 is objective and concerns the property in a notionally vacant state. Regulation B13(5) depersonalises the assessment, so the characteristics and actual needs of the particular occupants are irrelevant. A tenant’s use of the property cannot alter its objective classification.
5. The correct construction is that a bedroom is a room capable of being used as a bedroom by any listed category of person, rather than a room capable of being used by the particular claimant. This was consistent with Nelson and IB; the Upper Tribunal had wrongly introduced a subjective element.
6. The discrimination argument did not alter the result. Carmichael had accepted the compatibility of the legislation and overall scheme with the ECHR, including in disability-related circumstances. No comparable medical need arose on these facts.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): appeal allowed; the decision of the Upper Tribunal was quashed and the claimant was held entitled to a two-bedroom property.
• Upper Tribunal (Administrative Appeals Chamber): in [2017] UKUT 471 (AAC), held that the relevant question was whether a room could be used as a bedroom by the actual occupants or class of occupants.