Independent Workers' Union of Great Britain & Ors, R (On the Application Of) v Mayor of London

For indirect discrimination, the public authority must justify the discriminatory impact of the measure, rather than the neutral measure in the abstract. The court asks whether the aim is legitimate, whether the measure corresponds to a real need, whether it is appropriate and reasonably necessary, and whether the adverse effects are proportionate. A democratically accountable public body receives an appropriate margin of discretion in making general economic, social and environmental policy, provided the court remains satisfied that the justification has a reasonable foundation. Regulatory charges which cause individuals to alter their working patterns will not ordinarily engage Article 8. A statutory road charge may fall within the ambit of A1P1 without amounting to a deprivation of possessions. The claim was dismissed because the congestion-charge amendments were proportionate and objectively justified.

The claimants challenged amendments to London’s congestion-charging scheme removing the exemption for private hire vehicles, except designated wheelchair-accessible vehicles. They alleged indirect discrimination under sections 19 and 29(6) of the Equality Act 2010, interference with Articles 8 and 14 and Article 1 of the First Protocol to the ECHR, and disproportionate effects on BAME and female drivers and disabled passengers.

The Mayor and Transport for London relied on the legitimate aim of reducing traffic and congestion in central London while preserving wheelchair-accessible provision. The court considered proportionality, the Convention claims and an additional argument concerning whether BAME drivers were put at a particular disadvantage.

1. Claim dismissed. The removal of the private hire vehicle exemption, subject to the wheelchair-accessible vehicle exception, was a proportionate means of achieving the legitimate aim of reducing traffic and congestion in the Central Congestion Zone without reducing wheelchair-accessible provision.
2. Under section 19(2)(d) of the Equality Act 2010, the burden was on the defendant. The court adopted the familiar proportionality approach: the measure had to correspond to a real need, be appropriate and reasonably necessary, and strike an objective balance between its discriminatory effects and the aim pursued. The anticipated reduction in private hire vehicle traffic, supported by expert forecasting and broadly reflected in subsequent evidence, justified the measure. The court found no realistically less intrusive alternative that would address the particular increase in private hire vehicles.
3. The aim of preserving wheelchair-accessible vehicles formed part of the decision-maker’s thinking. The Mayor had considered the effects on BAME drivers, predominantly part-time female drivers and disabled passengers. Operators could absorb or pass on costs, alter practices or enable drivers to avoid the zone. The adverse effects, including increased working hours, reduced family time and higher fares, were proportionate in the circumstances.
4. The removal of the exemption did not ordinarily interfere with Article 8. Changes to a regulatory charging regime, even if they cause different or longer working hours, are generally too remote from private and family life. On the facts, neither individual claimant established an Article 8 interference. Alternatively, any interference would have been justified.
5. The charge was not a deprivation of possessions under A1P1. The court assumed, without deciding, that the scheme fell within the control-of-property provisions and held that it pursued a legitimate aim and struck a fair balance.
6. For Article 14, the court held that the measure was outside the ambit of Article 8 but, with some hesitation, within the ambit of A1P1. The differential effects were objectively justified. The court declined to decide, because it was unnecessary and insufficiently argued, whether the measure put BAME drivers at a particular disadvantage under section 19(2)(b) and (c).

First-instance judicial review claim. No appellate history was stated in the judgment.