SXC, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions & Anor

Damages under the Human Rights Act 1998 are not automatic after a finding of Convention-rights infringement. An award must be necessary to afford just satisfaction, taking account of all the circumstances, other remedies and Article 41 principles.

In a purely public-law challenge, quashing unlawful subordinate legislation and requiring reconsideration may provide sufficient just satisfaction. Financial compensation also requires loss caused by the breach. Where revised, apparently lawful provision is backdated and parity was not required, no financial loss is established.

The claimant had previously succeeded in challenging transitional arrangements for benefits claimants who had moved to Universal Credit. The court had quashed provisions in the Universal Credit (Managed Migration Pilot and Miscellaneous Amendments) Regulations 2019 because the difference between transitional payments for early migrants and transitional protection for a later managed-migration group had not been justified.

The Secretary of State subsequently made new regulations providing increased, backdated transitional payments. The claimant sought compensation for financial and non-financial loss. The issues were whether compensation was necessary to afford just satisfaction under section 8 of the Human Rights Act 1998, and whether the discrimination had caused recoverable loss.

1. Claim dismissed. No compensation was awarded.

2. Section 8 of the Human Rights Act 1998 gives the court a remedial discretion. Damages may be awarded only where, having regard to all the circumstances, including other relief and its consequences, an award is necessary to afford just satisfaction. The court must also take account of European Court of Human Rights principles under Article 41.

3. The claim was a purely public-law challenge. Its central objective was to quash unlawful subordinate legislation and require reconsideration. The quashing order and subsequent reconsideration were sufficient to address the breach and provide just satisfaction. Compensation is more likely to be primary where the Act vindicates a right equivalent to a private-law right, but the discrimination relied on here did not correspond to a recognised private-law wrong.

4. The financial-loss claim also failed. The liability judgment had found that the difference between the benefits groups was unjustified because it had not been explained. It had not held that Convention compliance required identical treatment or transitional protection for the claimant. Assuming the new regulations were lawful, their backdated payments left no financial loss caused by the breach.

5. The same conclusion disposed of the non-financial-loss claim. Had compensation been necessary, the impersonal and non-personalised discrimination would have fallen within the third Vento band and warranted no more than £1,000. That assessment was alternative to the decision.

This was a first-instance compensation judgment following the court's earlier liability judgment, [2019] EWHC 1116 (Admin), which had quashed provisions in the proposed transitional regulations. This judgment made no award of compensation.