SXC, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions & Anor

This case concerns a claim for compensation under the Human Rights Act 1998 following an earlier liability judgment ([2019] EWHC 1116 (Admin)) which found that certain provisions in regulations proposed by the Secretary of State discriminated contrary to Article 14 read with Article 1 of Protocol 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The claimant sought damages for financial loss (the shortfall between Universal Credit and the transitional protection she would have received) and for non-financial loss (injury to feelings).

The court applied section 8 of the Human Rights Act 1998 and authorities on awards of compensation under that Act. It held that damages under section 8 are not automatic: the court must be satisfied that an award is necessary to afford just satisfaction and that causation is established.

The court concluded that compensation was not necessary to afford just satisfaction because the primary public law remedy (quashing the unlawful regulatory provisions) had been granted in the liability judgment and the Secretary of State had subsequently made new regulations providing altered transitional payments (backdated to migration dates). The court also concluded that the claim for injury to feelings would, if awarded, be modest because the discrimination was class-based rather than personalised.

Background and parties: The claimant (SXC) challenged regulations making transitional provision for claimants who had migrated to Universal Credit. The Secretary of State made regulations providing transitional payments to earlier migrants but provided transitional protection to claimants who had not yet migrated (the Regulation 4A Group). The liability judgment ([2019] EWHC 1116 (Admin)) quashed provisions in the original Managed Migration Pilot Regulations on the ground of unlawful discrimination (Article 14 read with Article 1 of Protocol 1). SXC then sought compensation for financial and non-financial loss arising from that discrimination.

Nature of the claim / relief sought: (i) an award of damages under section 8 of the Human Rights Act 1998 for financial loss (difference between Universal Credit and the transitional protection she would have received), and (ii) damages for non-financial loss (injury to feelings).

Issues framed: (i) whether an award of damages was necessary to afford just satisfaction under section 8(3) HRA 1998, (ii) whether the claimant had established causation between the unlawful discrimination and the financial loss claimed, and (iii) the appropriate quantum for any award for non-financial loss.

Court's reasoning and disposition: The court surveyed authorities on section 8 awards and emphasised two central considerations: necessity for just satisfaction and causation. The court found that the claimant's disadvantage arose from a regulatory decision that had been quashed and that the Secretary of State subsequently made New Regulations (SI 2019/1152) providing higher transitional payments, backdated to the date of migration. The court concluded that (a) the remedies granted in the liability judgment (quashing the unlawful provisions) and the Secretary of State's re-making of regulations addressing transitional payments sufficiently vindicated the claimant's Convention rights so that an award of damages was not necessary to provide just satisfaction, and (b) it was not necessary to find that parity with the Regulation 4A Group was the only lawful outcome, so the new regulations did not automatically indicate further unlawfulness. On non-financial loss, the court held that, if any award were appropriate, the discrimination was class-based and would attract a modest award within the lower Vento band (about £1,000). The court therefore made no award of compensation.

Procedural posture: First instance Administrative Court decision on remedy following an earlier liability judgment; the court addressed the claim for compensation and dismissed it.

The court dismissed the claimant's claim for compensation. Rationale: under section 8 HRA 1998 damages are available only if necessary to afford just satisfaction; the public law remedies already obtained (quashing the unlawful provisions in the liability judgment) and the Secretary of State's subsequent New Regulations providing backdated transitional payments meant that an award of damages was not necessary. The court also observed that the discrimination was class-based and that any injury to feelings award would, at most, have been modest (approximately £1,000), but no award was made.