London Borough of Bromley v Broderick

Where a housing authority relies on an applicant’s refusal of suitable accommodation to bring the main homelessness duty to an end, suitability is assessed by reference to the circumstances when the offer was made. The authority need not keep the applicant in contention for accommodation becoming available over the following days.

This differs from an accepted offer, whose suitability may require reconsideration because circumstances later change. A challenge to the authority’s choice of when to perform its housing duty is also distinct from a challenge to suitability. Such a timing challenge will rarely succeed where housing is scarce and the authority has acted within its discretion.

The Council accepted that it owed the respondent the main homelessness duty under section 193(2) of the Housing Act 1996. It offered her temporary accommodation about 30 miles outside its district. She refused the offer because its location separated her and her young son from family and support networks.

The Council decided under section 193(5) that its duty had ceased. Its reviewing officer upheld that decision after considering the accommodation available on the offer date, the shortage of local housing and the respondent’s circumstances. On an appeal under section 204, the County Court quashed both decisions because the Council had not investigated whether nearer accommodation became available between the offer and its refusal.

The central issue was whether suitability had to be assessed only when the offer was made or across the ensuing period before refusal.

1. Appeal allowed. Where a housing authority relies on section 193(5) of the Housing Act 1996 following an applicant’s refusal, the suitability of the offered accommodation is determined by reference to the position on the date of the offer. The Act does not require suitability to be assessed across a period of several days while the applicant remains in contention for accommodation that might later become available. Such a process would impede allocation, leave scarce properties empty and disadvantage homeless applicants generally: paras 43–46.

2. Three questions must be distinguished: whether the accommodation offered was suitable; whether the authority should have performed its housing duty on a different date; and whether suitability should later be revisited. An accepted offer may cease to be suitable because the household’s circumstances change. A housing authority therefore has a continuing obligation to keep accepted accommodation’s suitability under review while its accommodation duty continues. Exceptionally, a major change in the availability of alternatives might itself affect suitability: paras 38–43.

3. A decision to make an offer on a particular date, rather than wait, is separately challengeable. Successful challenges will be relatively rare, especially where a persistent shortage of housing forms the background to the authority’s decisions. An authority need not delay in the mere hope that preferable accommodation will become available: paras 42 and 48.

4. The offer was suitable. The reviewing officer had treated location as the central issue, considered the governing guidance and order, examined the accommodation available on the offer date, and addressed the respondent’s reasons for wishing to remain closer to the district. No timing challenge had been squarely raised on review, and the officer was not required to address one. Nor had any relevant later change of circumstances been alleged: paras 47–49.

5. The County Court had therefore erred by requiring the Council to investigate availability after the offer date. Newey LJ allowed the appeal. Baker and Flaux LJJ agreed: paras 51–54.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): The Council’s appeal was allowed unanimously. The County Court’s approach of requiring consideration of accommodation becoming available after the offer date was rejected: [2020] EWCA Civ 1522.

2. County Court at Central London: His Honour Judge Lamb QC allowed the respondent’s section 204 appeal and quashed the Council’s original discharge-of-duty decision and review decision. No citation is stated.