Nikolaeva v London Borough of Redbridge

Under the Housing Act 1996, section 193(7), a final offer of accommodation must be made by the local housing authority and must relate to an actual property which the applicant can occupy. Where a housing association is to provide the property, a nomination alone is insufficient, but the authority’s offer may be conditional on a successful nomination and the offer of a tenancy. A refusal may be established by declining to sign the tenancy agreement and maintaining that position. The authority must consider whether the property remains available and whether the applicant had a reasonable period to decide, taking account of the applicant’s circumstances. Review decisions should be read benevolently and practically; an error which does not undermine the reasoning does not require the decision to be quashed.

Redbridge accepted that it owed Mrs Nikolaeva the main housing duty under section 193(2) of the Housing Act 1996. In May 2017, it nominated her for a ground-floor flat to be provided by Sanctuary Housing Association and stated that the offer would be final if the nomination succeeded and a tenancy was offered. Sanctuary offered a tenancy on 29 June 2017, but Mrs Nikolaeva declined to sign the tenancy agreement. Redbridge decided that the duty had ceased under section 193(7). Its review decision upheld that conclusion, and His Honour Judge Luba QC dismissed Mrs Nikolaeva’s appeal on 9 December 2019. The Court of Appeal considered the identity and nature of the final offer, the timing and continuation of the refusal, the availability of the property, and whether sufficient time had been allowed for consideration.

Lady Justice Asplin gave the leading judgment. Lord Justice Lewis and Lord Justice Bean agreed. The appeal was dismissed.

1. Nature of the final offer. Read in the context of section 193 as a whole, section 193(7) concerns an offer made by the local housing authority, not by the housing association which may grant the tenancy. The offer must relate to an actual property which the applicant can occupy. A mere nomination under section 159(2) is insufficient because it may never result in accommodation being provided. References to R (Faizi) v London Borough of Brent and Griffiths v St Helens Metropolitan Borough Council were made by way of an aside and were not relied upon.
2. Conditional offer. Redbridge’s letter properly distinguished the nomination from the final offer. Its offer was conditional upon the nomination succeeding and Sanctuary offering a tenancy of the identified property. That condition was satisfied on 29 June 2017.
3. Refusal. The reviewing officer was entitled to find that the refusal began when Mrs Nikolaeva declined to sign the tenancy agreement and was maintained through 4 July. Her letter of 3 July made her position clear. There was no evidence that she sought further advice, requested more time, or became willing to sign. The conclusion was rational and supported by the evidence. Even if the reasoning were read differently, the decision was the only rational conclusion available on the evidence.
4. Reasonable opportunity. Paragraph 14.22 of the Homelessness Code of Guidance requires a reasonable period to consider an offer, assessed by reference to the applicant’s circumstances. There is no fixed period. Mrs Nikolaeva had several weeks from the May letter and the June viewing, and a further opportunity to seek clarification before 4 July.
5. Availability. Because the offer was conditional upon actual accommodation being offered, the property’s availability was relevant. The evidence showed that it remained available on 3 July, with no evidence that it had been taken back on 4 July. The review decision therefore should not be set aside.

The County Court’s jurisdiction on an appeal under section 204 includes the full range of issues otherwise capable of consideration on judicial review, consistent with Runa Begum v Tower Hamlets LBC [2000] 1 WLR 3036. The court adopted the benevolent, realistic and practical approach to review decisions described in Holmes-Moorhouse v Richmond upon Thames London Borough Council [2009] 1 WLR 413, while stressing the importance of concise, accurate and comprehensible reasoning.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Dismissed the appeal against the County Court’s order.
2. Central London County Court: His Honour Judge Luba QC dismissed the appeal against Redbridge’s review decision on 9 December 2019.
3. Review decision: Redbridge upheld its decision that the main housing duty had ceased under section 193(7) of the Housing Act 1996.