Al Ahmed v London Borough of Tower Hamlets

For an out-of-time homelessness appeal under the Housing Act 1996, good reason is a straightforward statutory test. The court must assess all the circumstances without importing the stricter CPR relief-from-sanctions approach or presumptions about unrepresented litigants. Lack of representation, efforts to secure legal aid, practical barriers and personal frailties may carry appropriate weight, particularly where they explain why a meaningful point of law could not be formulated. The court must scrutinise diligence, and the 21-day limit remains the basic rule. A finding of good reason opens a discretion; it does not guarantee permission. An appellate court should be slow to interfere with the first-instance evaluative judgment.

The Council decided that Mr Al Ahmed was not in priority need and upheld that decision on review. After he sought assistance from Crisis and legal aid, an appellant’s notice was lodged out of time. HHJ Hellman granted permission to appeal out of time. The Council appealed to the High Court, where Dove J allowed the appeal and refused permission: [2019] EWHC 749 (QB).

Mr Al Ahmed appealed to the Court of Appeal. The central issue was whether his lack of representation and efforts to obtain legal assistance could constitute good reason under section 204(2A) of the Housing Act 1996, and whether the County Court judge’s evaluative assessment could properly be displaced.

Sir Stephen Richards gave the leading judgment. Lord Justice Phillips and Lord Justice David Richards agreed. The appeal was allowed and HHJ Hellman’s order was reinstated.

1. Section 204(2A) of the Housing Act 1996 establishes a statutory gateway for permission to bring a homelessness appeal out of time. The 21-day limit remains the basic rule. Where permission is sought after the deadline, the statutory wording addresses both the failure to appeal in time and any delay in applying for permission. The Council’s attempt to raise the latter issue for the first time on a second appeal was too late.
2. The phrase good reason requires a straightforward statutory assessment. It is a question of fact and evaluative judgment based on all the circumstances known to the court. No gloss, presumption or preconception should be added. The approach in [2008] EWHC 1568 (Comm), [2013] EWHC 2528 (QB) and [2013] EWHC 3687 (QB) was consistent with that analysis. The court also applied the principle in [2005] EWHC 2112 (QB) that the merits cannot be considered unless good reason is established.
3. The CPR relief-from-sanctions principles in [2013] EWCA Civ 1537 and [2014] EWCA Civ 906, as applied by analogy in [2014] EWCA Civ 1633 and [2015] EWCA Civ 1286, could not be imported into section 204(2A). The CPR governs the procedure for an appeal but does not define or alter the statutory test. Unlike the CPR framework, section 204(2A) contains no later stage at which the merits or other circumstances can cure the absence of good reason.
4. In the homelessness context, the court may give full and appropriate weight to lack of representation, attempts to obtain legal aid, practical barriers and individual frailties. Those matters may explain why an applicant could not formulate a meaningful point of law in time. The 21-day limit does not become optional: diligence in seeking assistance must be examined carefully, and a finding of good reason merely opens a discretion in which other relevant considerations, including the local authority’s position, may be considered. The context-specific approach was consistent with [2018] EWCA Civ 751 and distinguishable from the rules-based reasoning in [2018] UKSC 12.
5. Judge Hellman’s assessment was evaluative and supported by the evidence. He was entitled to find that Mr Al Ahmed reasonably relied on Crisis while seeking representation and could not identify useful legal grounds before obtaining legal advice. Dove J therefore had no proper basis to interfere with that assessment.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): In [2020] EWCA Civ 51, allowed Mr Al Ahmed’s appeal and reinstated the County Court order granting permission to appeal out of time.
2. High Court of Justice, Queen’s Bench Division, Administrative Court: Dove J allowed the Council’s appeal and refused permission to bring the homelessness appeal out of time in [2019] EWHC 749 (QB).
3. County Court at Central London: HHJ Hellman found good reason under section 204(2A) of the Housing Act 1996 and granted permission for the appeal to be brought out of time.