Valla PTC Ltd v Faiman

Permission to seek summary judgment under CPR 24.4(1) will generally be granted where the claim has been validly served, the defendant has had an opportunity to participate, and the claimant reasonably believes that judgment on the merits may be more readily enforced abroad than a default judgment.

On the merits, summary judgment is appropriate where the claim is clear and well evidenced and the defendant identifies no real defence. A concern that judgment may harm the defendant’s business is not, without more, a compelling reason for a trial under CPR 24.2(b). Even if supported by evidence, it may justify only a delay, not the use of the trial process.

Valla PTC Ltd sought permission to apply for summary judgment against Jonathan Moss Faiman under a loan consolidation agreement. The defendant had not filed an acknowledgment of service or defence, but had been validly served, knew of the proceedings and hearing, and had acknowledged that he owed the debt.

The court considered whether permission should be granted under CPR 24.4(1), and whether the claim should then be determined summarily. The defendant accepted that the debt was due but submitted that judgment would damage his company and reduce his ability to pay.

1. Permission. The court granted permission under CPR 24.4(1). The defendant had been validly served under section 1140 of the Companies Act 2006, knew of the proceedings and application, and had an opportunity to participate and serve evidence. A reasonable belief that judgment on the merits may be more readily enforced abroad than a default judgment was a proper reason for seeking permission.
2. Summary judgment. The claim was clear and well evidenced. The procedural requirements of PD24 paragraph 2 had been complied with. The defendant’s correspondence, reply to the letter before action, and later security agreement acknowledged the debt. He candidly accepted at the hearing that the debt was due and identified no defence.
3. Compelling reason for trial. The submission that judgment would destroy the defendant’s company did not engage CPR 24.2(b). It was unsupported by evidence and, in any event, concerned a possible reason for delaying the application rather than a reason making the trial process and additional court resources justifiable.
4. The conditions for summary judgment were therefore satisfied. Judgment was entered for the principal debt of EUR 29,763,040, together with the stated simple and default interest, subject to updating any sterling equivalent in the order.