Lees v Lloyds Bank Plc

The claimant sought disclosure and other relief principally on the basis that Lloyds had assigned or securitised the mortgages over three properties, and that Lloyds had failed to comply with data subject access requests under the Data Protection Act and the GDPR. The court held that the claimant had not established on the balance of probabilities that Lloyds had divested itself of the legal or equitable interests in the charges, and that the Court of Appeal decision in Paragon Finance plc v Pender was an insuperable obstacle to the claimant's defence to possession. The court further held that Lloyds had provided adequate responses to the data subject access requests and that, even if shortcomings existed, the court would in any event exercise its discretion against ordering relief because the requests were numerous, repetitive, aimed at obtaining documents rather than personal data and amounted to a collateral attack on concluded possession proceedings. The claim was dismissed as totally without merit.

This is a first‑instance Part 8 claim by Mr Lees against Lloyds Bank Plc. The claimant had earlier faced possession proceedings in the County Court concerning three buy‑to‑let properties, where possession orders were made and his appeals were exhausted. In this High Court claim he sought (i) disclosure under the Civil Procedure Rules and Practice Direction 51U in relation to alleged securitisation and assignments; (ii) relief for alleged failures to comply with data subject access requests under the Data Protection Act 1998 (and later DPA 2018/GDPR); and (iii) relief under sections 136 and 196 of the Law of Property Act 1925.

The court framed the issues as whether Lloyds had assigned its legal or equitable interests in the charges (such as to prevent it bringing possession proceedings), whether the claimant was entitled to specific disclosure under CPR/PD51U or the Law of Property Act provisions, and whether Lloyds had breached data protection obligations such that court‑ordered compliance or compensation was appropriate.

On the factual and legal analysis the judge found:

• There was no proper evidence on the balance of probabilities that Lloyds had assigned its interest in the mortgages or charges. The claimant's expert material and prospectus exhibits did not link the specific charges to any securitisation and, in any event, Paragon Finance plc v Pender precluded the claimant's title‑based defence to possession by a registered chargeholder.
• Relief under CPR disclosure provisions was not available on the claimant's pleaded basis: CPR 31.12 and PD51U provisions do not permit freestanding specific disclosure orders as sought, CPR 31.16 requirements had not been met, and sections 136 and 196 LPA 1925 were irrelevant to the relief claimed.
• The Data Protection claims largely arose under the DPA 1998 as the DSARs were made before 25 May 2018. Lloyds had provided answers to the DSARs and, even if any failure was arguable, the court would exercise its discretion against the claimant given the abusive, repetitive nature of the DSARs, their collateral purpose to resist possession, and the lack of any real prospect that the material would assist the claimant given Paragon.

The judge therefore dismissed the claim as totally without merit and directed parties to file submissions on consequential orders, including costs and any application for permission to appeal.

The claim is dismissed as totally without merit. The judge found no real prospect that the claimant could prove that Lloyds had assigned or otherwise divested itself of title to the charges; the CPR and Practice Direction provisions relied on did not support the freestanding disclosure sought; Lloyds had adequately answered the data subject access requests and, even if not, the court would decline to order relief in the exercise of its discretion, given the abusive and collateral nature of the requests and the decisive effect of Paragon Finance plc v Pender on the possession defence.

Prior proceedings in the County Court resulted in orders for possession against the claimant in respect of the three properties and the claimant's appeals and varied applications in the County Court were dismissed as totally without merit. The claimant previously pursued a similar claim against Aldermore Bank PLC which was dismissed on 1 November 2019 and his application for permission to appeal that dismissal was refused by Falk J on 23 March 2020. All avenues of appeal from the County Court possession orders had been exhausted by the time of this High Court hearing.