Bankole-Jones v Watford Borough Council

A statutory housing appeal under section 204 of the Housing Act 1996 is confined to points of law and is not a rehearing. The court should read the reviewing officer’s decision benevolently and realistically.

Vulnerability under section 189(1)(c) requires a comparative assessment of whether the applicant is significantly more vulnerable than an ordinary person if made homeless. The assessment must consider the applicant’s circumstances in the round, including available support and any causal link between the relevant condition and homelessness. There is no additional functionality test. Rough sleeping during the COVID-19 pandemic did not automatically establish vulnerability. The reviewing officer was entitled to reject the appeal on the evidence, and the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant brought a statutory appeal under section 204 of the Housing Act 1996 against the respondent local authority’s review decision under section 202. The authority accepted that he was homeless and eligible for assistance but concluded that he was not in priority need.

Four grounds alleged that the review failed to address priority need arising from the COVID-19 pandemic, inadequately assessed vulnerability, misunderstood evidence concerning Personal Independence Payment, and applied an impermissible functionality test. The appeal had been transferred from the County Court to the High Court under section 42 of the County Courts Act 1984.

1. Jurisdiction and approach. The County Court had power under section 42(2) of the County Courts Act 1984 to transfer the statutory appeal. Section 204 of the Housing Act 1996 confined the appeal to points of law. It did not permit the court to rehear the homelessness application. A point not raised before the reviewing officer should be approached with particular caution, especially where it was not obvious that the officer should have considered it.
2. COVID-19 and section 189(1)(d). The authority’s failure to address section 189(1)(d) did not disclose an error of law. The argument advanced on appeal differed from the argument put to the reviewing officer, and there was insufficient evidence that the YMCA accommodation would have become unsuitable because of the pandemic. The court declined to give an obiter view on the meaning of emergency or causation in the absence of an adequate factual basis.
3. Vulnerability under section 189(1)(c). The statutory question was whether the individual applicant, if homeless, would be significantly more vulnerable to harm than an ordinary person if made homeless. The assessment was practical and contextual. It required consideration of all relevant features, including third-party support and the causal connection between the relevant characteristic and the effects of homelessness. Rough sleepers were not a separate statutory category, and the pandemic did not make every rough sleeper vulnerable automatically.
4. No additional functionality test. The reviewing officer’s single use of the word functionality did not establish that an additional test had been applied. Read as a whole, the decision applied the correct comparative test and considered the likely effect of the appellant’s conditions on his ability to deal with homelessness.
5. Evidence and disposition. The authority was entitled to take the PIP letter into account alongside the medical evidence and the appellant’s questionnaire. The PIP award did not compel a finding of vulnerability. None of the four grounds was made out. The appeal was dismissed.

High Court (Administrative Court): The statutory appeal was transferred from the County Court and dismissed.