HM Inspector of Health and Safety v Petrofac Facilities Management Ltd (Petrofac Facilities Management Ltd v HM Inspector of Health and Safety)

The general dispensing power in the introductory Rules does not permit wider relief from a specialist procedural time limit set by a specific rule.

Where a specific rule prescribes a single ground for extension, that provision governs appeals under it and limits the tribunal's discretion accordingly.

For the computation of the 21‑day period in Rule 105(1)(a), a period "beginning with" the date of service includes that day.

The Appellant (an H M Inspector) issued a prohibition notice on 21 February 2019. The respondent employer presented a notice of appeal on 14 March 2019.

The Employment Judge allowed the late appeal relying on the general dispensing power in Rule 5 of the 2013 Rules. The Appellant appealed that decision to the Employment Appeal Tribunal. The respondents cross‑appealed the Employment Judge's finding that the appeal was out of time.

The central questions were whether Rule 5 could relieve non‑compliance with Rule 105(1) and how the 21‑day period in Rule 105(1)(a) is to be computed.

1. Disposition: The appeal by the Inspector is allowed. The cross‑appeal by the respondents is refused. The Employment Judge had no jurisdiction under Rule 5 to relieve non‑compliance with the time limit in Rule 105(1); the Notice of Appeal was out of time. (See paras [1]–[2], [11]–[17], [28]).

2. On the relationship between rules: Rule 105(1)(b) is a specific, self‑contained provision limiting relief to cases where it was not reasonably practicable to present an appeal within 21 days. A general power in Rule 5 does not displace that specialist rule. Where a specific rule governs, it derogates from the general provision. This follows the principle specialia derogant generalibus and ordinary principles of statutory/rules interpretation. (See paras [12]–[17].)

3. On the scope of the discretion: Rule 5 is a broad, general discretion. It applies to "any time limit" in the Rules but should not be used to undermine a specialist regime where Parliament (or the rule‑maker) has prescribed a limited ground for extension. Consequently the Employment Judge erred in applying Rule 5 to relieve late presentation under Rule 105(1). (See paras [10]–[17], [22].)

4. On computation of time: The wording of Rule 105(1)(a) "before the end of the period of 21 days beginning with the date of the service" has an established meaning. The specified day is included in the period. Rule 4(3) and other general computation rules do not displace the specific wording of Rule 105(1)(a). Thus the appeal was late. (See paras [6]–[7], [25]–[27].)

5. Practical guidance: Notes to Prohibition Notices that combine old and new rule wording may mislead. However, where the specific statutory/regulatory rule limits relief to "reasonable practicability", misleading notes do not create an additional ground for extension. (See paras [18]–[23].)

6. Order: Allow the Appellant's appeal. Refuse the respondents' cross‑appeal. The Notice of Appeal dated 14 March 2019 was out of time and must be treated accordingly. (See para [28].)

• Employment Appeal Tribunal: Allowed the appeal by the Inspector and refused the respondents' cross‑appeal (10 March 2020) (this judgment).
• Employment Tribunal: Permitted the late notice of appeal by exercising Rule 5 dispensing power (decision under appeal).