City & Country Bramshill Ltd v Secretary of State for Housing, Communities And Local Government & Ors

The policy against isolated homes in the countryside concerns physical isolation from a settlement. Whether a group of buildings constitutes a settlement, and whether proposed housing is isolated from it, are matters of planning judgment. The number of proposed dwellings and the presence of other buildings do not themselves prevent the policy from applying.

Neither section 66(1) of the Planning (Listed Buildings and Conservation Areas) Act 1990 nor national heritage policy requires a preliminary net balance between heritage harm and heritage benefit. A decision-maker may identify harm and then weigh it against all public benefits, including heritage benefits. Local heritage policies directed to preservation may receive substantial weight despite omitting an express public-benefit balance.

The appellant proposed extensive residential development at Bramshill Park, which contained a grade I listed mansion and a grade I registered park and garden. A planning inspector dismissed appeals concerning three housing schemes because the site was an isolated and unsustainable countryside location and the heritage harm was not outweighed by public benefits.

Waksman J partly allowed the appellant’s statutory challenges but upheld the inspector’s decisions on those three schemes and on costs: [2019] EWHC 3437 (Admin). The appellant challenged that result.

The principal issues concerned the meaning of “isolated homes in the countryside”, locational sustainability, the treatment of heritage harm and benefit under section 66(1) and national policy, the weight and application of local heritage policies, and the inspector’s refusal of costs.

1. Appeal dismissed. The inspector correctly understood and lawfully applied the national policy concerning isolated homes in the countryside. Following Braintree District Council v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2018] EWCA Civ 610, the question was whether the proposed housing would be physically isolated from a settlement. What constitutes a settlement, and whether development is isolated from one, are matters of fact and planning judgment. The number of proposed homes and the presence of existing buildings did not displace that inquiry.

2. The observation in Dartford Borough Council v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2017] EWCA Civ 141, concerning development within the curtilage of an existing structure, was obiter and established no competing principle. The inspector was entitled to find that the existing institutional complex was not a settlement and that all the proposed housing would remain isolated from settlements.

3. The inspector lawfully assessed sustainability. She considered the fallback institutional use, sustainable transport, trip generation and greenhouse-gas emissions. The evidence did not permit a reliable emissions comparison. In any event, lower emissions would not have overcome the site’s isolated location and lack of genuine alternative transport modes. Those conclusions involved lawful planning judgment.

4. Section 66(1) of the Planning (Listed Buildings and Conservation Areas) Act 1990 and paragraphs 193–196 of national policy prescribe no single method for balancing heritage harm and benefit. They do not require a preliminary “net” or “internal” heritage balance before other public benefits are considered. A decision-maker may identify harm to each asset and then weigh that harm against all public benefits, including heritage benefits. The observations in Palmer [2016] EWCA Civ 1061 concerned mitigation which avoided harm; they created no wider mandatory principle.

5. The inspector gave great or considerable weight to conservation and then exercised her planning judgment when weighing particular harms and benefits. Her method complied with section 66(1) and national policy. The local heritage policies were directed to the same preservation objective and did not preclude the national-policy balance. She could lawfully give them significant weight without first inviting further submissions.

6. The refusal of costs was also lawful. The inspector properly considered whether the council’s grounds could reasonably be advanced, rather than treating their success on the merits as decisive.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): The appeal was dismissed unanimously. The court upheld the decisions concerning appeals 4, 5 and 6 and the refusal of costs: [2021] EWCA Civ 320.
2. High Court (Planning Court): Waksman J partly allowed and partly dismissed the statutory challenges. He quashed decisions concerning appeals 7 to 14 and 16, but upheld the inspector’s decisions concerning appeals 4 to 6 and costs: [2019] EWHC 3437 (Admin).
3. Planning inspector: The inspector dismissed the planning appeals concerning the three housing schemes and rejected the appellant’s application for costs.