Chief Constable of Avon and Somerset Police, R (on the application of) v Police Misconduct Tribunal & Ors

A police misconduct hearing chair has a continuing obligation to keep under review whether a witness should be called. The governing test remains whether the chair reasonably believes that calling the witness is necessary in the interests of justice. A material dispute of fact does not automatically require oral evidence where the dispute was apparent before the hearing, the parties considered witnesses unnecessary, and the witness cannot give direct evidence on the issue in dispute. A tribunal may assess seriousness when determining whether conduct amounts to gross misconduct, provided the parties have had a fair opportunity to address the relevant matters. The structured approach to sanction requires assessment of seriousness, consideration of the purposes of sanctions, and selection of the outcome that best fulfils those purposes.

The Chief Constable sought judicial review of a police misconduct tribunal’s decision concerning PC Pauline Archer. She admitted using a racist term at work, accepted breaches of three Standards of Professional Behaviour, and accepted that the conduct amounted to gross misconduct. The Tribunal imposed a final written warning rather than dismissal.

The Chief Constable challenged the decision on four grounds: failure to call witnesses, irrational factual findings, inadequate reasons, and an unlawful or irrational approach to sanction. The central issues were whether the Tribunal had acted unfairly by not calling Ms Sasani, whether its findings about intention and remorse were rational, whether it had properly addressed the Equality Act 2010, and whether its reasoning on outcome was adequately structured.

1. Witnesses. The chair’s obligation under regulation 23(3) of the Police (Conduct) Regulations 2012 continues throughout the proceedings. The test remains whether the chair reasonably believes that calling a witness is necessary in the interests of justice. Regulation 33(4), concerning adjournments, does not replace that test where the issue arises during the hearing. The two questions remain distinct, although they may be linked.
2. Procedural fairness did not require Ms Sasani or Ms Thompson to be called. The material facts, breaches of the Standards and gross misconduct were admitted. The only material dispute concerned whether the incident was an isolated aberration or revealed a more concerning character. Ms Sasani could describe her perception, but could not give direct evidence of PC Archer’s mindset. Both parties’ representatives had considered witnesses unnecessary, and no material change in the evidence had arisen at the hearing.
3. The Tribunal’s findings that the term was used unintentionally, that PC Archer recognised immediately that it was wrong, and that she accepted responsibility were rationally open to it. The Tribunal had heard PC Archer’s evidence and was entitled to assess her credibility and mindset.
4. The Tribunal correctly understood the Equality and Diversity Standard as extending beyond unlawful discrimination under the Equality Act 2010. The Tribunal was not required to decide whether the conduct amounted to harassment under section 26 because harassment had not been alleged. The conduct was capable of constituting harassment, but the omission did not invalidate the decision and would not have affected the sanction.
5. The Tribunal gave adequate reasons. It accepted that the racist term had been used and that it amounted to gross misconduct, while making its own assessment of intention and mindset. It followed the structured approach to sanction by assessing culpability, harm, aggravating and mitigating factors, considering the purposes of sanctions, and selecting a final written warning. The public sector equality duty was also sufficiently addressed.
6. The claim was dismissed.

First-instance judicial review in the Administrative Court. The claim challenging the Police Misconduct Tribunal’s decision of 12 December 2019 was dismissed.