Turner, R (On the Application Of) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions

Benefits adjudication is inquisitorial, but that does not eliminate every reference to a claimant’s burden of providing information. In a good-cause decision under the Employment and Support Allowance Regulations 2008, it is lawful to look to the claimant for an explanation, provided officials also consider relevant information reasonably available to them. The decision maker must take reasonable steps to inform themselves about the claimant’s health and disability. The intensity of that inquiry depends on the circumstances, including the potential consequences of ending entitlement. The public sector equality duty does not create a free-standing obligation to remove disadvantage or achieve a particular result where the statutory scheme already directs attention to disabled persons’ needs. A policy which accurately states these requirements is lawful.

The claimant challenged the Secretary of State’s policy for deciding whether claimants who failed to return information or attend a work capability assessment had shown good cause. She also challenged the decision to terminate Errol Graham’s income-related employment and support allowance after he failed to attend an assessment and did not respond to communications or safeguarding visits.

The challenge relied principally on regulations 22–24 of the Employment and Support Allowance Regulations 2008 and section 149 of the Equality Act 2010. The issues were whether the policy unlawfully placed the burden on claimants and failed to require adequate inquiry, and whether the individual decision was unlawful.

1. Policy challenge dismissed. References in the policy to a claimant bearing the burden of showing good cause were lawful. The process remained inquisitorial. The claimant generally could and must provide information, but officials had to consider relevant information reasonably available to them. The policy, read as a whole, conveyed that both participants had a role to play.
2. Regulation 24 required decision makers to consider the claimant’s state of health and disability. Applying Secretary of State for Education and Science v Tameside MBC [1977] AC 1014 and the principle explained in Kerr v Department for Social Development (Northern Ireland) [2004] UKHL 23, officials had to take reasonable steps to obtain information relevant to those matters which was reasonably accessible to them. The necessary intensity of inquiry varied with the facts.
3. Section 149 of the Equality Act 2010 did not materially enlarge that duty. It required due regard to the need to advance equality of opportunity. It was not a free-standing duty to remove disadvantages, meet needs or achieve a particular result. In this statutory context, the regulations and policy already directed attention to disability. The approach was consistent with R (Brown) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2008] EWHC 3158 (Admin) DC, R (McDonald) v Kensington & Chelsea RLBC [2011] UKSC 33 and R (Isaacs) v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2009] EWHC 557 (Admin).
4. The individual decision was not shown to be unlawful. Officials knew of the claimant’s previous mental disablement and responded with inquiries to the GP, attempted communications and two safeguarding visits. They did not know of the later deterioration and isolation, nor of a person able to provide further information. Applying R (Balajigari) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWCA Civ 673, the further inquiries suggested were sensible or desirable but were not required by the Tameside standard.
5. The proposed argument concerning a separate duty to inquire into regulation 29 was outside the pleaded grounds and was not decided. The claim was dismissed.

First-instance judicial review in the Administrative Court. The judgment records no appeal or earlier decision in the same proceedings.