Imam, R (On the Application Of) v The London Borough of Croydon

Anonymity under CPR 39.2(4) requires a case-specific balancing exercise between the applicant’s privacy rights and the rights protected by open justice, including freedom of expression. There is no general exception for housing cases, disability, or the publication of private medical information. The applicant bears the burden of showing that non-disclosure is necessary, and the court must consider the strength of the evidence, the timing of the application, the fact that the claimant initiated proceedings, and the effect on public access to justice. Consent by the parties is insufficient. Anonymising a judgment without restricting wider disclosure is generally incoherent and unenforceable. Judicial functions are excluded from the relevant Equality Act 2010 discrimination provisions.

The claimant, a disabled wheelchair user bringing judicial review proceedings concerning the defendant local housing authority’s statutory duties under Parts 6 and 7 of the Housing Act 1996, applied under CPR 39.2(4) for anonymity and reporting restrictions. The application was made after the public trial and shortly before judgment was due to be handed down. It relied on the private nature of evidence concerning the claimant’s accommodation and disability.

The court considered the principles in XXX v London Borough of Camden, [2020] EWCA Civ 1468, and other open justice authorities. The issues were whether anonymity was necessary under CPR 39.2(4), whether the judgment could be anonymised or redacted without wider restrictions, and whether publication would engage section 15 of the Equality Act 2010.

1. The application for anonymity and reporting restrictions was dismissed. The alternative requests to anonymise the claimant in the trial judgment or to redact the relevant passage were also rejected.

2. An application under CPR 39.2(4) may be made at any stage, including after a public judgment. However, delay is a relevant factor in the balancing exercise. The court must independently determine whether non-disclosure is necessary; party consent cannot determine the issue.

3. The applicable exercise requires an intense, case-specific comparison of the claimant’s Article 8 rights with the public and media rights protected by Articles 6 and 10 ECHR. The applicant bears the burden of justifying a departure from open justice. There is no general exception for private matters, disability, housing claims, or health information.

4. The claimant’s evidence established that the information was intensely personal and connected with disability, but there was no specific evidence of the degree of interference or distress that publication would cause. The claimant had initiated the proceedings, had previously allowed the material to appear in public documents and at trial, and had applied only at the last minute. Those factors outweighed the general submissions in favour of anonymity.

5. Anonymising the judgment while imposing no wider restriction would be inappropriate, because the claimant’s identity could be obtained from other public sources and published. Redaction was also refused because it would impair the intelligibility of the judgment to the public and any appellate or future court.

6. Section 15 of the Equality Act 2010, read with section 29 and paragraph 3(1) of Schedule 3, does not apply to the giving of a High Court judgment, which is a judicial function. It was therefore unnecessary to decide whether publication would otherwise constitute unfavourable treatment or satisfy the proportionality requirements.

7. Anonymity applications should ordinarily be made at the earliest stage of proceedings. The court criticised the late application, but the parties agreed that there should be no order as to costs.