Rose, R (On the Application Of) v The Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police

The court held that an appropriate authority assessing whether a recorded complaint meets the mandatory referral criteria in Schedule 3 paragraph 4 and regulation 4 of the Police (Complaints and Misconduct) Regulations 2012 must consider the nature of the conduct alleged in the complaint, not the merits of the complaint. If the complaint, properly read, alleges conduct which, if substantiated, would amount to serious corruption as defined in the IPCC Statutory Guidance (May 2015) — for example an attempt to pervert the course of justice — the complaint must be referred to the IPCC/IOPC without delay.

The judge found that Appeals Officer Brennan mischaracterised the Claimant’s 12 July 2017 complaint as limited to the contents of an MG3A form, whereas read as a whole (and in the light of the Claimant’s later appeal material) it alleged a deliberate cover‑up of an earlier investigation and conduct capable of constituting an attempt to pervert the course of justice. Accordingly the Decision of 2 October 2019 declining referral was wrong in law. The court considered and rejected the defendant’s argument under section 31(2A) SCA 1981 that relief should be refused because the outcome would not have been substantially different, finding it was not highly likely the outcome would have been the same. The Decision was quashed.

This is a first‑instance judicial review in which the Claimant challenged Appeals Officer Brennan’s decision of 2 October 2019 rejecting his appeal against local resolution of a complaint made on 12 July 2017 (the "2018 Complaint"). The 2018 Complaint arose from an earlier criminal investigation (2014) into alleged thefts from the Claimant’s business; the Claimant alleged that officers had withheld evidence and that family members of a serving police officer had been protected. He then complained about Chief Inspector Jones’s handling of those concerns and alleged that Jones had deliberately "circled the wagons" and condoned a deliberate cover‑up.

The Claimant sought quashing of the Decision and an order that the complaint be referred to the IOPC. The core legal issues were the interpretation and application of paragraph 4 of Schedule 3 to the Police Reform Act 2002 and regulation 4 of the Police (Complaints and Misconduct) Regulations 2012, and the meaning of "serious corruption" in the IPCC Statutory Guidance (May 2015). The court addressed whether the appropriate authority must assess the merits of a complaint when deciding whether mandatory referral is required or whether it must consider only the nature of the conduct alleged.

The court concluded (i) the appropriate authority must look at the conduct alleged and determine objectively whether that conduct, if proved, would fall within the Guidance definition of serious corruption; (ii) it is not for the appropriate authority at the referral stage to determine the merits of the complaint; and (iii) where a complaint alleges conduct that, if substantiated, would amount to an attempt to pervert the course of justice or conduct likely seriously to harm the administration of justice, mandatory referral to the IPCC/IOPC is required.

Applying that approach, the judge held that the 12 July 2017 complaint (taken together with the later appeal material before Appeals Officer Brennan) did allege deliberate conduct capable of amounting to an attempt to pervert the course of justice and therefore met the threshold for mandatory referral. The Decision was therefore wrong in law and was quashed. The court considered the Senior Courts Act 1981 s.31(2A) defence and concluded it did not bar relief because it was not "highly likely" the outcome would have been the same; the court declined to find the case met the exceptional public interest gateway in s.31(2B). The judge indicated he was minded to limit relief to quashing the Decision, with further submissions invited on possible mandatory relief.

The claim succeeded. The Decision of 2 October 2019 was quashed because Appeals Officer Brennan mischaracterised the 12 July 2017 complaint; properly read it alleged conduct which, if substantiated, would constitute an attempt to pervert the course of justice (within the Guidance definition of "serious corruption") and therefore required mandatory referral to the IPCC/IOPC. Section 31(2A) SCA 1981 did not preclude relief on the facts, and the court confined relief to quashing the Decision (with further submissions invited on mandatory relief).