Matthew and others v Sedman and others

The Supreme Court considered whether a cause of action that accrued at, or immediately after, midnight following the expiry of a deadline should be treated as accruing on the day after midnight for the purpose of the six-year limitation periods in sections 2, 5 and 21(3) of the Limitation Act 1980. The court held that where a deadline ends at midnight and the result is a whole, undivided day following midnight, that whole day is to be included in the computation of the six-year period. The judgment treats Gelmini v Moriggia as a valid authority for that exception (a true "midnight deadline" situation) and distinguishes earlier authorities which reject fractions of a day because those cases involved parts of a day rather than an undivided day. Excluding the whole undivided day would have the effect of extending the statutory six-year period by an entire day and thereby unduly prejudicing defendants; accordingly the appeal was dismissed and the Welcome Claim held to be statute-barred.

Background and parties:

• The appellants are trustees and beneficiaries of a trust which held shares in Cattles plc. The respondents were professional trustees who failed to lodge a claim in the Welcome Scheme before the Bar Date of Thursday 2 June 2011.
• The Welcome Claim alleges negligence and breach of trust (and was contended also to be in breach of contract) arising from the respondents' failure to submit a claim in the Welcome Scheme before midnight on 2 June 2011.

Procedural history:

• The proceedings were commenced by claim form on Monday 5 June 2017. The respondents obtained summary judgment in the High Court ([2017] EWHC 3527 (Ch)) on the ground that the Welcome Claim was statute-barred. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appellants' appeal ([2019] EWCA Civ 475; [2020] Ch 85). Permission to appeal to the Supreme Court was later granted.

Nature of the issue and relief sought:

• The principal issue was the correct computation of the six-year limitation period under sections 2, 5 and 21(3) of the Limitation Act 1980 when a cause of action accrues at, or immediately after, midnight at the end of the day specified as the deadline. The appellants sought damages and/or equitable compensation and other relief; the respondents sought strike out/summary judgment on limitation grounds in respect of the Welcome Claim.

Issues framed by the court:

1. Whether Friday 3 June 2011 should be included in the six-year limitation period or excluded under the traditional rule that the day of accrual is excluded from computation.
2. Whether established authorities that exclude fractions of a day apply to a midnight deadline that yields a full undivided day.

Court's reasoning:

• The court reviewed the line of authority (including Mercer v Ogilvy, Lester v Garland, The Goldsmiths' Co, Stewart v Chapman, Radcliffe v Bartholomew, Marren v Dawson Bentley & Co Ltd and Pritam Kaur) and concluded that those cases addressed situations involving fractions or parts of a day and do not establish a rule excluding a whole undivided day that follows a midnight deadline.
• Gelmini v Moriggia was identified as the relevant authority dealing with a true midnight deadline; the Supreme Court treated Gelmini as an exception to the general rule rejecting fractions of a day and as applicable to cases where the cause of action exists throughout the whole day following midnight.
• The court emphasised practical reality and rejected metaphysical divisions of time. Excluding an entire undivided day would lengthen the statutory six-year period by a complete day and risk prejudicing defendants; that consequence weighed against treating the day after midnight as excluded.
• The court therefore concluded that 3 June 2011 was a whole day for limitation purposes and must be included in the six-year computation, rendering the Welcome Claim issued on 5 June 2017 (after the expiry of the six-year period that ended on 2 June 2017) statute-barred.

Outcome:

• The appeal was dismissed; the Welcome Claim is time-barred.

Appeal dismissed. The Supreme Court held that in a true "midnight deadline" case where the cause of action exists throughout the whole day following midnight, that whole undivided day is included in the computation of the six-year limitation periods under sections 2, 5 and 21(3) of the Limitation Act 1980. Gelmini v Moriggia represents the applicable exception to the general rule excluding parts of a day; excluding a whole undivided day would improperly lengthen the statutory period and prejudice defendants.

High Court: summary judgment granted on limitation grounds [2017] EWHC 3527 (Ch). Court of Appeal: appeal dismissed [2019] EWCA Civ 475; reported [2020] Ch 85. Permission to appeal to the Supreme Court initially refused but later granted; Supreme Court judgment [2021] UKSC 19 dismissing the appeal.