Matthew and others v Sedman and others

For limitation purposes, the day on which a cause of action accrues is ordinarily excluded because the law does not count a fraction of a day as a whole day. That justification does not apply where a cause of action arises at midnight or at the beginning of the following day. The following day is then, in practical terms, a complete and undivided day.

That complete day must be included in the limitation period. Excluding it would extend the period prescribed by Parliament by one whole day and prejudice the defendant. Whether the cause of action is legally attributed to the expiring day or the first moment of the following day does not alter this calculation.

The appellants were beneficiaries and successor trustees of a trust. They alleged that the respondent former trustees had negligently and in breach of trust failed to submit a claim under a scheme of arrangement by midnight on Thursday 2 June 2011. Proceedings were issued on Monday 5 June 2017.

The High Court granted summary judgment for the respondents, holding that the claim was outside the six-year periods prescribed by sections 2, 5 and 21(3) of the Limitation Act 1980: [2017] EWHC 3527 (Ch). The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal: [2019] EWCA Civ 475; [2020] Ch 85.

The issue before the Supreme Court was whether Friday 3 June 2011, the complete day immediately following the midnight deadline, counted towards the six-year limitation period.

1. The appeal was dismissed unanimously. Lord Stephens delivered the judgment, with which Lord Hodge, Lady Arden, Lord Sales and Lord Burrows agreed. Friday 3 June 2011 counted towards the six-year limitation period. The period therefore expired at the end of Friday 2 June 2017, and the proceedings issued on Monday 5 June 2017 were statute-barred.

2. The ordinary rule excludes the day on which a cause of action accrues because the law rejects fractions of a day. Its purpose is to prevent part of a day from being counted as a whole day, which would shorten the period prescribed by sections 2, 5 and 21(3) of the Limitation Act 1980. The authorities relied upon for that rule concerned events occurring during a day. They did not establish that a complete day following a midnight deadline must also be excluded.

3. A midnight deadline forms an exception to that general rule. Whether the cause of action accrued at the expiry of the final day or at the first moment of the next day made no practical difference. The following day was a complete and undivided day throughout which the cause of action existed. The law would not recognise the stroke of midnight, or an infinitesimal period thereafter, as creating a legally material fraction of that day.

4. Gelmini v Moriggia [1913] 2 KB 549 was properly understood as establishing this exception. It was consistent with Radcliffe v Bartholomew [1892] 1 QB 161. It should have been distinguished, rather than rejected, in Marren v Dawson Bentley & Co Ltd [1961] 2 QB 135, which concerned an accident part-way through a day. Nor had Gelmini been implicitly disapproved in Pritam Kaur v S Russell & Sons Ltd [1973] QB 336.

5. Excluding the complete day following a midnight deadline would produce a limitation period of six years and one day. That would distort the period enacted by Parliament and prejudice the defendant. The same point was demonstrated by reducing the period hypothetically to one day: exclusion would allow two complete days for commencing proceedings.

6. The word “from” in the statutory provisions could be inclusive or exclusive and did not resolve the issue by textual analysis alone. The judgment addressed the law of England and Wales only, since Scotland and Northern Ireland were governed by separate statutory provisions.

1. United Kingdom Supreme Court: Dismissed the appeal unanimously and affirmed that the claim was statute-barred: [2021] UKSC 19.
2. Court of Appeal: Underhill and Irwin LJJ dismissed the appeal, holding that the complete day following the midnight deadline counted towards the limitation period: [2019] EWCA Civ 475; [2020] Ch 85.
3. High Court: Judge Hodge QC granted summary judgment for the respondents because the claim had been issued after the six-year limitation period: [2017] EWHC 3527 (Ch).