Rachel Riley v Laura Murray

A defence of truth requires the defamatory imputation to be substantially or essentially equivalent in gravity to the true position. An allegation that a person made an unequivocal statement is not necessarily proved by showing that an ambiguous publication could reasonably convey a similar implication.

For honest opinion, the statement itself must indicate the opinion’s basis. The truth of that indicated basis is a separate question. An opinion expressly and exclusively premised on a single false factual assertion cannot be supported by unrelated facts.

Public interest is a broad concept encompassing public statements and conduct on political matters. A publisher’s belief in publication must nevertheless be reasonable. An obvious, materially less damaging alternative meaning cannot be disregarded when presenting an ambiguous statement as unequivocal.

The claimant, a television presenter and political activist, posted a tweet commenting on an earlier tweet by a journalist after an egg had been thrown at Jeremy Corbyn. The judge found that her tweet was deliberately provocative and obviously ambiguous: it could criticise hypocrisy or suggest that Mr Corbyn deserved to be attacked.

The defendant later tweeted that the claimant had said Mr Corbyn deserved to be violently attacked because he was a Nazi. That publication did not reproduce or provide access to the claimant’s tweet. The claimant succeeded in libel and received £10,000 damages. The High Court rejected defences under sections 2, 3 and 4 of the Defamation Act 2013: [2021] EWHC 3437 (QB).

The defendant appealed against the rejection of truth, honest opinion and publication on a matter of public interest. The claimant relied on a respondent’s notice seeking to uphold the judgment on additional grounds.

1. The appeal was dismissed unanimously. The High Court correctly rejected all three statutory defences.

2. For the defence of truth under section 2(1) of the Defamation Act 2013, the imputation to be proved was that the claimant had publicly stated that Mr Corbyn deserved to be violently attacked. The claimant’s tweet was capable of conveying a similar implication, but it was ambiguous and made no express, unequivocal statement to that effect. Those positions were not identical. The judge was entitled to find a significant difference in gravity between offering one possible interpretation and reporting that interpretation as an unequivocal fact. The imputation was therefore not substantially true: per Warby LJ at [28]–[37], with whom Dingemans and Arnold LJJ agreed.

3. The basis condition in section 3(3) asks only whether the statement complained of indicated the basis of the opinion. It is determined from the statement’s intrinsic qualities. Whether the indicated basis was true is immaterial at that stage and is addressed separately under section 3(4): at [44]–[49].

4. The court preferred the view that Parliament did not intend section 3(4)(a) to sever the common-law link between the facts indicated and the facts capable of supporting the opinion. It was unnecessary finally to resolve that general issue. The particular opinion was expressly and exclusively premised on the false factual allegation. Unrelated facts could not support the proposition that the claimant had demonstrated dangerousness or stupidity by making that statement. The honest opinion defence therefore failed: at [50]–[62].

5. The concept of a matter of public interest in section 4 is broad. It included the public conduct of a prominent activist who published a provocative statement to a very large audience about politically significant attacks. The subject was not purely personal or private: at [69]–[74].

6. The defendant honestly believed publication was in the public interest, but that belief was unreasonable. The claimant’s tweet had an obvious, materially less damaging interpretation. The defendant ought reasonably to have appreciated that ambiguity and could not reasonably present the more damaging interpretation as unequivocal while withholding the source material. Her editorial wish not to increase traffic to the original tweet did not justify depriving readers of its text or accurate context: at [75]–[88].

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): The defendant’s appeal against the rejection of the statutory defences was dismissed unanimously: [2022] EWCA Civ 1146.
2. High Court, Queen’s Bench Division: Nicklin J rejected the defences of truth, honest opinion and publication on a matter of public interest under the Defamation Act 2013, entered judgment for the claimant and awarded £10,000 damages: [2021] EWHC 3437 (QB).