Rachel Riley v Laura Murray

The Court of Appeal dismissed the defendant’s appeal against a libel judgment. The appeal raised statutory defences under the Defamation Act 2013: the defence of truth (s.2), honest opinion (s.3) and publication on a matter of public interest (s.4). The court upheld the trial judge’s findings that the defendant’s tweet conveyed a factual allegation (that the claimant had publicly said Jeremy Corbyn deserved to be violently attacked) and a defamatory opinion, but that the published account of the claimant’s tweet misrepresented an ambiguous original tweet (the "Good Advice Tweet").

Key legal principles applied: the single meaning rule for natural and ordinary meaning; the requirement under s.2 to show substantial truth of the pleaded imputation; the three-part test under s.3 for honest opinion (statement of opinion, indication of basis, and that an honest person could have held the opinion on facts existing at publication); and the s.4 two-stage test of public interest and reasonable belief, with allowance for editorial judgment. The court held (i) the truth defence failed because the defendant presented one definitive factual meaning where the original tweet was ambiguous, and that misrepresentation was not substantially true; (ii) the honest opinion defence failed because the opinion was expressly premised on the untrue factual allegation and could not be sustained once that factual premise failed; and (iii) the public interest defence failed because it was unreasonable to publish the misleading, uncontextualised account (including deliberately omitting the original tweet) when the ambiguity and less damaging meaning were obvious.

The claimant, a well-known television presenter with a large Twitter following, sued for libel over a tweet by the defendant (a political stakeholder manager) which alleged that the claimant had publicly stated in a tweet that Jeremy Corbyn deserved to be violently attacked and which denounced the claimant as "dangerous" and urged people not to engage with her.

The factual background was that the claimant had posted a short reply to an earlier January tweet by Owen Jones (the "Good Advice Tweet" or "GAT") after an egging incident involving Mr Corbyn. The GAT was ambiguous and prompted divergent reactions on Twitter. The defendant posted a tweet (the Defendant’s Tweet) that described the claimant as having said Corbyn deserved to be violently attacked; that tweet did not reproduce or quote the GAT or otherwise give readers direct access to it.

Procedural posture: at first instance Nicklin J determined natural and ordinary meaning in a preliminary trial and found that the Defendant’s Tweet carried a factual allegation (the claimant had stated Corbyn deserved violent attack) and an expression of opinion. At the substantive trial the judge found the publication caused or was likely to cause serious harm, rejected the statutory defences and entered judgment for the claimant with damages reduced for the claimant’s provocative conduct and because the judgment itself provided vindication. The defendant appealed the rejection of the statutory defences; the Court of Appeal heard the appeal from Nicklin J [2021] EWHC 3437 (QB).

The issues for the Court of Appeal were whether: (i) the truth defence under s.2 succeeded given that some readers reasonably interpreted the GAT as supporting the factual allegation; (ii) the honest opinion defence under s.3 saved the defendant where the opinion was based on the claimant’s tweet; and (iii) the public interest defence under s.4 was made out, specifically whether the defendant reasonably believed publication was in the public interest.

The court reasoned that:(ul>

The truth defence requires proof of the single defamatory imputation pleaded in the Defendant’s Tweet, and while the GAT could bear an interpretation that resembled the factual allegation, the trial judge correctly held that it was not an unequivocal statement to that effect. By presenting a single, definitive factual account the defendant misrepresented an ambiguous original and so failed to prove substantial truth.

Under s.3 the question whether the statement "indicated the basis" of the opinion is separate from whether any factual basis is true. However, the court accepted the trial judge’s conclusion that where an opinion is expressly and exclusively premised on a single factual assertion, the honest opinion defence will fail if that factual premise is untrue; here the opinion was expressed "by so doing" (i.e. by making that factual statement) and so could not be sustained.

Under s.4 the tweet concerned the claimant’s public conduct and thus a matter of public interest, and the defendant honestly believed publication to be in the public interest. Nevertheless the judge rightly concluded that it was unreasonable to present an uncontextualised and misleading factual account when the original tweet’s ambiguity and a less damaging interpretation were obvious; the defendant’s deliberate omission of the GAT and failure to give readers accurate context undermined the reasonableness of her belief.

The Court of Appeal therefore dismissed the appeal and affirmed rejection of the statutory defences for the reasons above.

Appeal dismissed. The Court of Appeal agreed with the trial judge that (1) the defendant failed to prove substantial truth under s.2 because she represented an ambiguous tweet as an unequivocal factual statement; (2) the honest opinion defence under s.3 failed because the opinion was expressly premised on a factual assertion shown to be untrue; and (3) the s.4 public interest defence failed because it was unreasonable to publish a misleading, uncontextualised account when a less damaging interpretation of the original tweet was obvious and the defendant had omitted the original material.

Appeal from the High Court of Justice, Queen's Bench Division, Media and Communications List (Nicklin J) [2021] EWHC 3437 (QB). Permission to appeal was granted in respect of rejection of statutory defences; permission to challenge damages assessment was refused at first instance.