CHRISTINA EFTHIMIOU (R on the application of) v THE MAYOR AND COMMONALTY AND CITIZENS OF THE CITY OF LONDON

A charging policy for a public leisure facility does not place disabled users at a substantial or particular disadvantage merely because disabled people are statistically more likely to have limited means. Where the same concession is available to disabled and non-disabled users on benefits, the financial barrier arises from limited income rather than disability.

The reasonable-adjustments duty is assessed objectively and is owed to disabled people generally. Its application depends on all the circumstances, including the service provider’s resources, the cost and consequences of an adjustment, and whether the proposed adjustment is objectively identifiable rather than arbitrary. A service provider is not required to provide free or substantially cheaper services to disabled users simply because the service benefits them.

The claimant, a disabled woman receiving benefits, challenged the defendant’s charging policy for swimming at Kenwood Ladies’ Pond. She alleged failures to make reasonable adjustments under sections 20, 21 and 29 of the Equality Act 2010, indirect discrimination under section 19, and discrimination contrary to Article 14 read with Article 8 and Article 1 of Protocol 1.

The policy imposed compulsory charges but provided a 40% concession for disabled users and people receiving specified benefits. The claimant sought free or cheaper swimming for disabled people and payment by instalments. The central issues were whether the policy caused the necessary comparative disadvantage and, if so, whether the proposed adjustments were reasonable and whether the policy was justified.

1. Grounds 1 and 2 dismissed. The claim for failure to make reasonable adjustments and indirect discrimination failed. Permission on Ground 3 was refused.
2. For the reasonable-adjustments duty, the court identified three stages: identify the provision, criterion or practice; determine whether it places disabled persons at a substantial disadvantage compared with non-disabled persons; and assess whether reasonable steps were taken to avoid that disadvantage. The relevant PCP excluded the disability concession but retained the 40% concession available to people on benefits.
3. The claimant’s difficulty was financial. Disabled and non-disabled people with limited means received the same concession. The fact that a greater proportion of disabled people have limited income did not establish that the charging policy caused a disability-related disadvantage. The claimed health benefits of swimming were not shown to be sufficiently distinctive to disabled people generally to alter that conclusion.
4. In any event, the proposed adjustments were not reasonable. The duty is owed to disabled people generally and is assessed objectively in all the circumstances. The ponds were already heavily subsidised, the charity faced significant financial pressures, and free access for disabled swimmers would cause substantial direct and wider financial consequences. No objectively appropriate alternative concession could be identified. A direct-debit scheme would involve administrative costs, bad-debt risks and lost revenue. The court also rejected the argument that more monitoring or consultation would affect the result; the duty concerns substance rather than a separate obligation to consult.
5. Indirect discrimination also failed because the necessary causal connection between the PCP and the particular disadvantage was absent. The comparator of non-disabled people on benefits was appropriate. The policy was, in any event, a proportionate means of achieving legitimate aims, including financial sustainability, fair contribution by users and preservation of other services.
6. Article 14 was not engaged. The charging policy created no physical accessibility barrier within Article 8, and paying for a non-welfare leisure service did not bring the claim within Article 1 of Protocol 1. Even if a Convention right had been engaged, there was no disproportionate difference in treatment.

The parties were directed to agree the order.

First-instance judicial review claim in the Administrative Court. Permission was granted on Grounds 1 and 2 and refused on Ground 3; the renewed application for permission on Ground 3 was refused.