PLYMOUTH CITY COUNCIL v ABC

Successive applications for the same interlocutory relief are generally impermissible unless there has been a material change of circumstances or the applicant has discovered facts which could not reasonably have been deployed earlier. A later change in the law does not retrospectively reopen an earlier decision.

CPR Part 11 distinguishes between the existence of jurisdiction to try a claim and the court’s decision whether to exercise that jurisdiction. It is not a procedure for determining the merits or summarily disposing of a claim. Procedural errors do not automatically invalidate proceedings, particularly where they cause no prejudice and can be cured. Reasonable adjustments for a vulnerable party are principally a matter for the court’s case management.

The claimant brought proceedings alleging that the defendant, its former employee, had downloaded personal data and confidential information. The defendant had previously given undertakings following an urgent without-notice application concerning the information.

The defendant applied under CPR Part 11 for a declaration that the court lacked jurisdiction or should not exercise it. She also made a renewed application for anonymity after an earlier anonymity application had been refused. The issues included successive applications, alleged defects in service and statements of case, alleged procedural abuse, reasonable adjustments, proportionality, and whether the claim should be halted on jurisdiction grounds.

1. The renewed anonymity application was dismissed. The earlier decision could not be reopened merely because the defendant wished to reargue it, relied on evidence previously available, or sought to rely on a non-retrospective amendment to CPR rule 39.2(4). The governing circumstances were a material change of circumstances or facts which could not reasonably have been known or deployed earlier. The court applied the approach in Chanel Ltd v FW Woolworth & Co Ltd [1981] 1 WLR 485, Woodhouse v Consignia plc [2002] 1 WLR 2558 and Tibbles v SIG plc [2012] 1 WLR 2591.
2. The CPR Part 11 application was dismissed. Part 11 encompasses both a challenge to the court’s power to try a claim and an argument that the court should not exercise that power. Those are conceptually and juridically distinct challenges, with different forms of relief. The court adopted the explanation in IMS SA v Capital Oil and Gas Industries Ltd [2016] 4 WLR 163 and Hoddinott v Persimmon Homes (Wessex) Ltd [2007] EWCA Civ 1203.
3. Errors in the address on the claim form did not invalidate service where the correctly addressed envelope was delivered and no prejudice resulted. Service was deemed under CPR rules 6.14 and 7.5(1). The authorities concerning defendants who never received notice, White v Weston [1968] 2 QB 647 and Nelson v Clearsprings (Management) Ltd [2007] 1 WLR 962, were distinguishable.
4. Other alleged defects, including signatures, statements of truth, typographical errors and the involvement of different legal representatives, did not deprive the court of jurisdiction. Procedural errors could be cured where appropriate. The court also held that reasonable adjustments were principally for the court under CPR Practice Direction 1A, not a duty imposed on the claimant under section 20 of the Equality Act 2010.
5. Part 11 was not a vehicle for assessing the merits, granting summary disposal, or deciding whether the claimant should have used disciplinary or other procedures. Any such challenge should be made under CPR rules 3.4 or 24.2. The court had jurisdiction and was not persuaded that it should decline to exercise it. Directions on costs and case management were reserved for written submissions.