AMJAD SALFITI v SADDIQ OMAR ABU SEEDO & Ors

An appellate court should rarely interfere with findings of fact made after a trial involving oral evidence. Intervention requires no evidence, a conclusion that no reasonable judge could have reached, or a conclusion that is rationally insupportable. The appellate court must assess the trial judgment as a whole and should not isolate individual evidential points. For limitation purposes, the relevant question is the nature of the action actually brought. Where fraud or concealment is alleged, knowledge of one related matter does not necessarily disclose the particular fraud forming the cause of action. A reasonable-diligence argument must be properly raised.

The appellant, the third defendant, appealed from an order made by HHJ Dight after a six-day trial in the County Court at Central London. The trial judge found that the claimant had a 50 per cent beneficial interest in commercial property, that the appellant had acted fraudulently and in breach of trust, fiduciary duty and contract, and that he was liable to indemnify the claimant and the other defendants.

The appeal challenged factual findings concerning a trust deed, the assessment of oral and documentary evidence, the effect of 2009 correspondence, limitation under the Limitation Act 1980, and the adequacy of the pleaded case. The central issues were whether the judge’s findings were open to him and whether the claims were statute-barred.

1. Appeal dismissed. The appeal principally challenged findings made after a six-day trial in which the appellant gave oral evidence over two days.
2. The appellate court must exercise marked restraint when reviewing findings based on oral evidence. Interference is justified only where there was no evidence supporting the finding, no reasonable judge could have reached it, or the conclusion was rationally insupportable. This approach applies to primary facts, evaluations and inferences. The appellate court must consider the trial judge’s assessment of the whole evidential picture rather than engage in selective “island hopping”.
3. The trial judge had properly considered witness consistency, the limited documentary evidence, context and inherent probabilities. His findings that the appellant was dishonest, had concealed the claimant’s interest, had created a false power of attorney and had commenced proceedings without authority materially supported the conclusions about the trust deed and the appellant’s conduct.
4. The finding that the first defendant signed the trust deed without reading or understanding it was rationally supportable. The 2009 correspondence did not require a different conclusion. It was for the trial judge to assess the weight of that correspondence alongside the other evidence.
5. For limitation purposes, the relevant focus was the actual causes of action brought against the appellant. The 2009 correspondence concerned the trust deed but did not disclose the particular alleged fraud concerning the source of the funds, the alleged loan, or the identity of the contracting party. The judge was therefore entitled to find that the fraud had not then been discovered for the purposes of section 32 of the Limitation Act 1980.
6. The appellant did not pursue the separate reasonable-diligence limb of section 32(1)(b). The additional proposed ground was refused because it did not reflect the trial judge’s findings and repeated matters already addressed.

• High Court (Chancery Division): Appeal from an order made by HHJ Dight in the County Court at Central London following a six-day trial. The appeal was dismissed.