AMJAD SALFITI v SADDIQ OMAR ABU SEEDO & Ors

The appellate court emphasises that findings of primary fact and assessments of credibility made by a trial judge who has heard oral evidence should only be disturbed in the rarest of cases; appellate intervention is justified only where there is no evidence, the conclusion is one that no reasonable judge could reach, or it is rationally insupportable. The court will therefore defer to the trial judge's evaluation of the whole body of evidence, including inferences drawn from limited documentary material.

This is an appeal from an order of HHJ Dight following a six-day trial concerning competing proprietary and personal claims to a long leasehold commercial property. The appellant (third defendant) challenged numerous factual findings, including the validity and provenance of a "Trust Deed", findings of dishonesty, and the judge's conclusion on limitation. The High Court (Falk J) heard argument on evidential assessment, the correct appellate standard for disturbing findings of fact, and whether correspondence in 2009 gave rise to sufficient knowledge to start the limitation period. The central issues were (a) whether the trial judge was entitled to find that the claimant had a 50% beneficial interest and that the third defendant had acted dishonestly; and (b) whether the claims were time-barred under the Limitation Act 1980. The appeal was dismissed.

1. Overall disposition: The appeal was dismissed and the judge's findings at first instance were upheld, including findings that the claimant had a beneficial 50% interest and that the third defendant had acted dishonestly (see paras. 10, 23, 74).
2. Appellate standard on findings of fact: The court reiterated that appellate interference with a trial judge's evaluation of oral evidence is only permissible in the rarest of cases where there is no evidence, the finding is one no reasonable judge could reach, or it is rationally insupportable. The court applied authority on restraint in overturning primary findings and endorsed the approach set out in [2017] UKSC 7 and other appellate authorities (see paras. 17–21).
3. Assessment of credibility and inferences: The judge was entitled to evaluate the internal consistency of witness evidence, the fit with contemporaneous documents and the inherent probabilities; where documentary evidence was sparse, drawing inferences from the whole 'sea of evidence' was permissible (see paras. 15–16, 20–21, 30).
4. Dishonesty findings: The trial judge's detailed findings that the third defendant's evidence was neither honest nor reliable were supported by specific factual findings (forged or altered documents, a false power of attorney, commencing proceedings without authority). The appellate court refused to overturn these findings, noting that many of them were unchallenged on appeal (see paras. 23–29, 96).
5. Trust Deed and signature: The trial judge was entitled to find that the Trust Deed was in a batch of documents presented for signature and that the signee may have signed without reading or understanding it; such a conclusion, combined with surrounding evidence, rationally supported the judge's conclusions about the document's provenance and use (see paras. 37–49, 54–57).
6. Limitation (Limitation Act 1980, s.32): The court held that the decisive question is the nature of the action and when the defendant had knowledge of the fraud or concealment that would start limitation. The 2009 correspondence did not, on the judge's findings, disclose the fraud or provide the requisite knowledge to start the s.32 period; the judge's conclusion that the fraud only became apparent later was open to him (see paras. 57–66, Addendum). The court relied on the Supreme Court's analysis in the FII litigation and subsequent authorities in framing the approach (see paras. 59, 62).
7. Procedure and grounds: The court refused permission to add a further ground attacking the tenor of the judge's findings about motive and scheme; it found the pleaded case gave the third defendant adequate notice and the judge had considered particularity and put allegations to him (see paras. 67–73).
8. Practical outcome: The trial judge's conclusions on proprietary remedy (express and resulting/constructive trust), tracing, breaches of trust and breach of fiduciary duty were upheld, as was the judge's order that the appellant indemnify the other parties; the appeal was dismissed (paras. 10, 74).