Ammar Al Assam & Ors. v Dimitrios Tsouvelekakis

A worldwide freezing order requires a good arguable case, a real risk that a judgment will go unsatisfied because of unjustified disposal or concealment of assets, and it must be just and convenient to grant relief. A good arguable case involving dishonesty does not, by itself, establish risk. The alleged dishonesty must be connected to the risk of dissipation. Delay is relevant but is assessed in the circumstances of the case and does not automatically defeat relief. The usual costs position for an interim freezing application is that costs are reserved, because the order is provisional and the underlying claim may fail at trial. A separate issue that will not be revisited may justify a different costs order.

The claimants sought a worldwide freezing injunction in proceedings concerning alleged negligent investment advice, breach of fiduciary duty, deceit, dishonest assistance and related contractual and tortious claims arising from investments held through two Cypriot trusts. The defendant accepted, for the application, that the claimants had a good arguable case but disputed any real risk of dissipation and relied on delay, his character and the absence of evidence of actual dissipation.

The court had previously rejected the defendant’s forum non conveniens application in Al Assam v Tsouvelekakis [2022] EWHC 451 (Ch). The issues were whether the requirements for freezing relief were met and, following the grant of the order, whether its costs should be reserved.

1. Freezing order granted. Under section 37 of the Senior Courts Act 1981, the court had to be satisfied that the claimants had a good arguable case, that there was a real risk that a judgment would go unsatisfied by reason of improper or unjustified disposal or concealment of assets, and that relief was just and convenient.
2. The good arguable case requirement was met. The causes of action had a substantial evidential basis and were not shown to be implausible. The court was dealing with an interim application and did not determine disputed facts or the ultimate merits.
3. The alleged dishonesty was sufficiently connected with dissipation. Dishonesty alone is insufficient, but the allegations here concerned the misuse of trust assets, concealment of investments, misleading portfolio reports and misleading evidence. Taken with the defendant’s financial expertise, offshore structures, incomplete explanations and prolonged failure to provide information, the evidence established a real risk of improper dissipation. Actual dissipation was not required.
4. Delay did not defeat the application. Its significance depended on the facts. The claimants had spent substantial time obtaining control of the trust companies, securing information and analysing complex transactions and foreign-law issues. The delay was not unjustified and did not negate their genuine belief in the risk.
5. The order was just and convenient. The defendant’s general concerns about regulatory and professional consequences were insufficiently particularised to outweigh the established risk.
6. Costs reserved. The general approach for interim injunctions applied. The freezing order was provisional, the underlying claims remained unresolved, and the trial could materially alter the assessment of the facts and risk. The court could not properly treat the claimants as having won the litigation. A different order might be justified for a discrete issue not capable of being revisited at trial, but no such issue arose here.