Shajmin Akter Parul (R on the application of) v The Secretary of State for the Home Department

Once the Secretary of State has decided under section 4(2) of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 to provide accommodation to avert an imminent Article 3 breach, the accommodation must be secured within a reasonable time. Reasonableness requires reasonable diligence, regard to the individual’s urgency, and respect for the absolute character of Article 3.

In the absence of evidence explaining searches, prioritisation, available stock, or other reasonable steps, a prolonged failure to provide agreed medically necessary accommodation was unlawful. Support supplied by family or charities does not excuse the Secretary of State’s failure to discharge the duty.

The claimant, a failed asylum seeker receiving section 4 support, sought judicial review of the Secretary of State’s failure to move her from shared ground-floor accommodation in Lambeth to self-contained, accessible accommodation in Tower Hamlets.

The Secretary of State had agreed in writing on 3 March 2022 to make that move. The claimant had serious epilepsy and other medical conditions, received treatment in Tower Hamlets, and relied on nearby family support. No evidence was filed to explain the continuing absence of suitable accommodation, searches undertaken, or the asserted shortage of properties.

The central issue was whether the delay in rehousing her breached the duty under section 4(2) of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999, or was otherwise unreasonable, and what relief should follow.

1. Claim allowed. The Secretary of State’s failure to rehouse the claimant in Tower Hamlets within a reasonable time was unlawful.

2. The statutory scheme required the Secretary of State to be satisfied both that the claimant appeared destitute and that accommodation was necessary to avoid an imminent prospect of an Article 3 breach. Where those conditions were met, the section 4(2) power became a duty through section 6(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998. On the evidence, and in the absence of contrary evidence from the Secretary of State, the 3 March 2022 decision to relocate the claimant was a decision made in discharge of that duty. It was artificial to separate the agreed relocation from the accommodation duty.

3. A reasonable period had to be assessed in the urgent context of preventing inhuman or degrading treatment. The Secretary of State supplied no evidence concerning prioritisation, searches, providers, voids, other available accommodation, or steps beyond the existing provider. By the hearing, 146 days had elapsed from the formal decision and 195 days from the relocation request. The claimant’s family support could not be treated as an answer to the Secretary of State’s failure.

4. The claimant’s serious medical needs, dependence on treatment and family support in Tower Hamlets, and increased risk of injury or death from epilepsy made the delay unreasonable in any event. The court initially considered a mandatory order appropriate because the Secretary of State had not shown that all reasonable steps had been taken.

5. After circulation of the draft judgment, the claimant was rehoused on 12 August 2022. A mandatory order was therefore no longer appropriate. The court granted declaratory relief that the pre-10 August 2022 failure to rehouse her in accordance with the 3 March decision was unlawful.

First-instance judicial review. Permission was granted on 24 June 2022 by a Deputy Judge of the High Court, who expedited the hearing. No appeal history is stated.