THE SPITALFIELDS HISTORIC BUILDING TRUST (R on the application of) v LONDON BOROUGH OF TOWER HAMLETS

The claimant sought judicial review of the council's decision (10 November 2021) to grant planning permission for redevelopment of the Old Truman Brewery site. The claimant relied upon three grounds: (1) that the Council unlawfully prevented committee members who had not attended the earlier meeting that deferred the application from voting at the re-convened meeting, contrary to their entitlement to vote; (2) that the Council unlawfully prohibited public speaking at the re-convened meeting despite substantive changes to the proposals; and (3) that the Council failed to have regard to relevant policies in the post‑examination draft Spitalfields Neighbourhood Plan.

Key legal principles: (a) councillors have a prima facie entitlement to vote at meetings but standing orders may lawfully regulate proceedings and business; (b) Schedule 12 para.42 to the Local Government Act 1972 authorises standing orders regulating proceedings and business of committees; (c) whether public speaking is required is fact‑sensitive and governed by the council's constitution and procedural discretion; (d) an officer's report must be read fairly and the substance of relevant development plan policies must be addressed rather than every policy cited verbatim.

Decision: The court concluded that the Council's "deferred meeting" voting rule (in particular paragraph 11.4 of the Rules and related Code provisions) fell within the Council's power to make standing orders under Schedule 12 para.42 LGA 1972 and was not unlawful; the refusal to allow public speaking at the re‑convened meeting was a lawful exercise of discretion in the circumstances; and the Draft Neighbourhood Plan had been given sufficient substantive consideration. The claim was dismissed.

The applicant (Spitalfields Historic Building Trust) challenged Tower Hamlets Council's grant of planning permission for redevelopment at Brick Lane and Woodseer Street. Following an April 2021 Development Committee meeting the application had been deferred to enable officers to negotiate section 106 obligations. The application then returned to committee on 14 September 2021 with an officers' supplemental report recommending approval. The Claimant alleged three errors of law: (i) members not present at the April meeting were wrongly prevented from voting at the September meeting; (ii) the Council unlawfully barred public speaking at the September meeting despite substantive changes to obligations; and (iii) the Council failed to have proper regard to material policies in the post‑examination draft Spitalfields Neighbourhood Plan.

• Relief sought: quashing of the planning permission and consequential relief by way of judicial review.
• Issues for decision:
  • Whether the Council's constitution (the Deferred Meeting voting rule comprising the Planning Code of Conduct and Development Procedure Rules) unlawfully deprived committee members of their entitlement to vote on a deferred application;
  • Whether the Council unlawfully prevented public speaking at the re‑convened meeting when paragraph 11.2 of the Rules (allowing public speaking where a "new full report" is presented) applied;
  • Whether the Council failed to have regard to material policies in the post‑examination draft neighbourhood plan (policies SPITAL1, SPITAL2 and SPITAL7 and related Local Character Area appraisals and view protections).

Court's reasoning (concise):

• Ground 1 (entitlement to vote): the court accepted the general proposition that councillors have a prima facie entitlement to vote, but held that a council may make standing orders "for the regulation of their proceedings and business" under Schedule 12 para.42 LGA 1972. Paragraph 11.4 and related provisions in the Constitution regulate committee proceedings and quoracy for deferred items and thus fall within that statutory power. The court rejected the submission that those provisions created a new sub‑committee or illegally altered committee membership, and observed that any ad hoc sub‑committee creation would require a clear positive act and attention to political balance duties under s.15 LGHA 1989.
• Ground 2 (public speaking): the Rules (paras.11.1 and 11.2) are not a precise statutory code and leave scope for discretion. The September report was a focused report addressing the reasons for deferral (section 106 obligations) rather than a "new full report"; the matter therefore fell within the Council's discretionary judgment whether to permit further oral representations. The Claimant had already made written and oral representations and the court was not satisfied it would have been prejudiced or that further oral submissions would likely have produced a different outcome.
• Ground 3 (draft neighbourhood plan): the court applied the well‑established approach that officer reports are read fairly and that the substance of relevant policies must be addressed rather than every policy cited verbatim. The April report and the September report (and the oral exchange at committee) engaged with the conservation area appraisal, views (including the Truman's chimney), and the emerging neighbourhood plan; the draft plan had been given significant weight and its SPITAL7 policy was expressly applied to the section 106 negotiation. The court concluded the draft policies were considered in substance and would not have changed the outcome.

The court therefore dismissed the claim. The judgment discusses relevant authorities (including Armstrong‑Braun, Ware, Etherton, Hartlands (NI), Bridgerow, Lensbury and others) and analyses statutory provisions including Schedule 12 LGA 1972, s.101 LGA 1972, s.15 LGHA 1989, s.70 TCPA 1990 (post‑examination draft neighbourhood plan) and s.31 SCA 1981 (no relief where outcome would not have been substantially different).

The claim is dismissed. The court held that (a) the Council's "deferred meeting" voting rule (Planning Code of Conduct para.13.4 and Development Procedure Rules para.11.4) was a lawful standing order regulating the proceedings and business of the Development Committee and so was within the authority conferred by Schedule 12 para.42 of the Local Government Act 1972; (b) the refusal to permit public speaking at the re‑convened meeting was a lawful exercise of the Council's discretion in the circumstances and not Wednesbury unreasonable; and (c) the post‑examination draft Spitalfields Neighbourhood Plan had been given appropriate substantive weight and the relevant draft policies were considered on the papers and at the meeting, so there was no material failure to have regard to them.