THE SPITALFIELDS HISTORIC BUILDING TRUST (R on the application of) v LONDON BOROUGH OF TOWER HAMLETS

A local authority may adopt a constitutional rule restricting voting on a deferred planning application to councillors who participated in the earlier consideration, provided the rule is authorised by statute. Such a rule regulates the committee’s proceedings and business under paragraph 42 of Schedule 12 to the Local Government Act 1972.

Rules governing public speaking on deferred applications may confer a degree of discretion and need not operate as rigid statutory provisions. Procedural fairness in planning consultations is fact-sensitive. A planning authority need not refer expressly to every relevant policy if, on a fair reading, the substance of the relevant considerations has been identified and assessed.

The claimant sought judicial review of the defendant local planning authority’s decision to grant planning permission for redevelopment of part of the Old Truman Brewery site in Brick Lane, London.

Three grounds were advanced: that councillors had unlawfully been prevented from voting because they had not attended an earlier meeting; that objectors had unlawfully been denied the opportunity to speak at the later meeting; and that the authority had failed to have regard to relevant policies in the draft Spitalfields Neighbourhood Plan.

The claim required the court to determine the legality of the deferred-meeting voting rule, the proper interpretation of the authority’s constitutional provisions on public speaking, and whether the planning reports and committee discussion had adequately addressed the draft plan.

1. Ground 1 failed. Every council or committee member has a prima facie entitlement to vote, and a restriction requires statutory authority. The defendant had not changed the Development Committee’s membership or created a deferred-applications sub-committee. The Constitution’s provisions concerned participation and voting, not membership, and no separate constitution or positive act establishing a sub-committee existed. The defendant had also failed to address the political-balance requirements in section 15 of the Local Government and Housing Act 1989.
2. Nevertheless, paragraph 11.4 of the Development Procedure Rules was a valid standing order under paragraph 42 of Schedule 12 to the Local Government Act 1972. The expression regulation of proceedings and business is wider than mere meeting procedure. It includes the substantive manner in which committee business is conducted. A deferred planning application forms part of a single decision-making process, and the authority may require members, so far as possible, to have participated in the earlier stage before voting. The related quoracy provision was part of the same lawful regulation.
3. Ground 2 failed. The provisions governing public speaking on deferred applications were imprecise and left an element of discretion. The application fell between the examples in paragraphs 11.1 and 11.2. The September report was neither a new full report nor strictly an addendum update report, and it was not unreasonable to place the application among deferred items. The claimant had already made oral and written representations, including detailed written representations after the September report. No further procedural unfairness or material prejudice was established.
4. Ground 3 failed. The reports and the September meeting had regard to the draft plan in substance. Although SPITAL1 and SPITAL2 were not expressly named, their design, heritage, character and views-related matters were addressed through detailed consideration of the conservation area appraisal and equivalent adopted policies. Section 70(2)(aza) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 required regard to the post-examination draft plan, not automatic preservation of identified views. The authority had substantively considered the impact on the Truman’s chimney and other relevant views.
5. The claim for judicial review was dismissed. The judge would, if necessary, have declined to refuse relief on the statutory no-difference test in section 31(2A) of the Senior Courts Act 1981 in relation to Grounds 1 and 2.