Ali Gulrez, R (on the application of) v The London Borough of Redbridge

Under the Housing Grants, Construction and Regeneration Act 1996, the statutory assessment of a Disabled Facilities Grant proceeds in stages. The authority must first identify whether the proposed works fall within section 23 and are necessary and appropriate under section 24(3)(a). It must then consider whether they are reasonable and practicable by reference narrowly to the age and condition of the building under section 24(3)(b).

A policy refusing a contingency adaptation merely because another adaptation performs the same primary function is unlawful. Each proposed adaptation must be assessed against the statutory criteria. The authority must also compare the safety risks of the proposed contingency with the risks arising when the primary equipment fails. A successful judicial review ordinarily results in quashing, without a mandatory order where lawful reconsideration can be expected.

The claimant, a severely disabled wheelchair user, challenged the London Borough of Redbridge’s refusal to progress a Disabled Facilities Grant application for a stairlift. The stairlift had been recommended as an emergency contingency because the claimant’s through-floor lift could fail, leaving him unable to reach his first-floor bedroom and bathroom.

The authority accepted that the stairlift was necessary and appropriate, but treated a replacement through-floor lift with a warranty and call-out service as the reasonable and practicable option. The claimant alleged unlawful application of the statutory test, fettering of discretion, indirect discrimination and reliance on cost. The central issues were the proper scope of section 24(3)(b) of the Housing Grants, Construction and Regeneration Act 1996 and whether the contingency policy was lawful.

1. The claim succeeded in part. The refusal of the stairlift application was unlawful and was quashed. A mandatory order and damages were refused.
2. The assessment under the Housing Grants, Construction and Regeneration Act 1996 is sequential. Section 23(1) is the gateway. Section 24(3) controls applications which pass through it. The ultimate decision is for the local housing authority, but it must apply the statutory criteria correctly.
3. The stairlift fell within a section 23(1) purpose and was accepted to be necessary and appropriate under section 24(3)(a). Section 24(3)(b) must be interpreted narrowly. It permits consideration only of matters relating to the age and condition of the building, principally whether those matters make the works a waste of public funds. It does not permit assessment by reference to the general suitability of the home or the disabled person’s wider needs.
4. The authority’s policy against funding a second adaptation as a contingency was unlawful. A backup adaptation may further the statutory objective of making the dwelling as safe as reasonably practicable. A warranty and call-out service may reduce periods of failure but does not eliminate them. The authority had to assess each proposed adaptation separately under sections 23 and 24 rather than select one supposedly preferable option.
5. The authority also assessed the wrong safety comparison. The issue was whether a stairlift was safer than relying solely on a warranty when the through-floor lift failed, not whether a stairlift was safer than the through-floor lift as the primary adaptation. The authority failed adequately to assess the risks during periods of lift failure.
6. There was no separate unlawful fettering of discretion because the statutory scheme imposed a duty where the criteria were met. However, the policy’s unlawful application rendered the decision illegal. The indirect-discrimination claim under section 19 of the Equality Act 2010 failed because the evidence did not establish particular disadvantage by comparison with others with a disability.
7. The claim was quashed. No mandatory order was required because the authority could be expected to take a fresh lawful decision. The claimant was awarded costs.