Winifred Helen Ward v Secretary of State for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities & Anor.

In a planning statutory review, the court examines legality, not the planning merits. An irrationality challenge succeeds only where an error of reasoning deprives the decision of logic. A planning judgment remains lawful where it falls within the range reasonably open to the inspector, even if another inspector might have reached a different conclusion. The court should not substitute its own assessment of weight. A public sector equality duty may be discharged through the decision as a whole. The fact that the duty is addressed later in the decision does not establish a failure to comply if the relevant matters were considered before the conclusion was reached. Giving the duty primary consideration does not require the planning appeal to succeed.

The claimant sought permission to bring a planning statutory review challenging an inspector’s dismissal of an appeal under section 78 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990. The appeal concerned refusal of permission for a Traveller site in the Green Belt, including a temporary or personal permission for the claimant’s partner and family.

Permission had been refused on the papers by Johnson J. Ground 1, concerning the weight given to Green Belt harm, was not renewed. The renewed application concerned alleged irrationality, including the treatment of the need for pitches, the absence of a five-year supply, the public sector equality duty, human rights, and the best interests of the children.

1. Permission refused. The renewed application for permission to apply for planning statutory review was refused.
2. The court’s function was to determine whether the inspector had made an error of law in light of the evidence and material considerations. It was not to review the planning merits or substitute its own judgment as to the weight to be given to competing considerations.
3. The inspector was entitled to conclude that the substantial Green Belt harm was not clearly outweighed by the need for a pitch, the lack of an up-to-date five-year supply of deliverable sites, the children’s need for settled accommodation, access to services, and the family’s personal circumstances. Those were planning judgments reasonably open to her.
4. The inspector was also entitled to refuse temporary or personal permission. The temporary nature of the permission and its personal limitation would reduce, but would not remove, the harm to the Green Belt. The conclusion that dismissal was proportionate and necessary was not irrational.
5. The public sector equality duty had been considered throughout the decision letter. The inspector addressed the applicants’ ethnic background and traditional way of life, their personal circumstances, the need to eliminate discrimination and advance equality of opportunity, the need to foster good relations, and the best interests of the children. Addressing the duty in detail towards the end of the letter was a matter of form rather than substance.
6. Moore was fact-specific. Its reasoning concerning the inspector’s failure to consider the possibility of a roadside existence did not assist the claimant because that matter had been considered here. The additional psychiatric evidence, unavailable to the inspector when the decision was made, could not impugn the decision.

1. High Court (Planning Court) — Johnson J refused permission on the papers. The claimant did not renew Ground 1.
2. High Court (Planning Court) — The renewed application on the irrationality ground was refused.