Kamala Devi Singh v Grief to Grace & Ors.

The court refused the claimant's application for an anonymity order under CPR 39.2 because the claimant had previously sought publicity for her claims and the use of a confidential schedule provided a less intrusive safeguard consistent with open justice. The court also refused permission to amend the particulars of claim under CPR 17.1 and 17.3 and directed that the claim be struck out. Key procedural and substantive defects justified refusal: the amended pleadings were prolix, unclear and failed to comply with Practice Direction 53 (PD 53) requirements for particulars in privacy, confidentiality and data protection claims; many of the proposed claims were out of time and CPR 17.4/limitation principles (Limitation Act 1980) barred reintroduction of time‑barred claims; and the claimant had effectively abandoned earlier pleadings so the court confined its consideration to the then current particulars.

The court applied the legal tests in CPR 39.2, the Practice Guidance on interim non‑disclosure orders (including the JIH principles), CPR 17.4 and the authorities on amendment and limitation (including Libyan Investment Authority v King and P&O Nedlloyd). The claim was struck out because defects went to the core of the pleaded causes of action and obstructed the just disposal of the proceedings.

Background and parties: The claimant is a practising Catholic who sought consecration to the Ordo virginum. She alleged various wrongs arising from an e‑mail sent by the second defendant to a diocesan safeguarding officer and from other disclosures. Defendants included a charitable organisation (first defendant), its director/priest (second defendant), the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Southwark (third defendant) and trustees of the Salford diocesan trust (fourth to fifteenth defendants and the twenty‑eighth defendant, the Bishop of Salford). The claimant sought a range of remedies including injunctions, damages for harassment, libel and causes of action in breach of confidence, misuse of private information and under data protection legislation.

Procedural posture and relief sought: The hearing concerned three issues: (i) an anonymity order under CPR 39.2; (ii) an application to amend the claim form and particulars under CPR 17.1; and (iii) a service issue on the second defendant which was resolved before the hearing. The claimant sought anonymity to protect highly sensitive information and sought to substitute revised and re‑revised particulars of claim (the fifth iteration by October 2022) removing defamation but pursuing breach of confidence, misuse of private information and data protection claims.

Issues framed: (i) Whether non‑disclosure of the claimant’s identity was necessary to secure the proper administration of justice; (ii) whether the proposed amendments should be permitted having regard to CPR 17.1/17.3, PD 53, CPR 17.4 and limitation law; and (iii) whether the amended pleadings contained sufficient particulars to enable the defendants to know the case to meet.

Court’s reasoning: On anonymity the court applied CPR 39.2 and Practice Guidance principles (including the JIH criteria). The court found anonymity inappropriate because the claimant had earlier intimated a desire for publicity, had not sought anonymity at the outset and had included in publicly available court documents material she now sought to protect. The court held that the confidential schedule provided by the claimant was the less intrusive means consistent with open justice and would avoid frustrating the administration of justice.

On amendment the court applied the established discretionary principles (Pearce v East and North Hertfordshire NHS Trust and related authorities) and the limits in CPR 17.4 where limitation is relevant. The court found that the revised particulars remained prolix, unclear and non‑compliant with PD 53 paras 8 and 9 which require identification of the information relied on, facts supporting privacy/confidentiality expectations, the acts of processing and the statutory provisions said to be breached. The confidential schedule included many items that lacked the quality of confidence or did not explain why they were private; the pleadings failed to identify which specific disclosures were relied upon on particular occasions; data protection tables lacked particulars of processing acts; and the claimant had abandoned earlier pleadings such that previously pleaded facts could not be relied upon to avoid CPR 17.4 limits (Libyan Investment Authority v King). Many claims against the Salford defendants were time‑barred by reference to events in 2015 and limitation principles would apply by analogy to equitable claims (P&O Nedlloyd). The defects were substantial, complained of by defendants and the court and, in the court's view, obstructed the just disposal of the proceedings.

Result: The court refused anonymity, refused permission to amend and directed that the claim be struck out. The defamation claims had been struck out earlier at an interlocutory hearing and the remaining proposed amendments were rejected as having no reasonable prospect of success or as insufficiently pleaded.

This was a first instance decision. The court refused the claimant's application for anonymity under CPR 39.2 and refused permission to amend the particulars of claim under CPR 17.1/17.3 and CPR 17.4, concluding that the proposed amendments were prolix, failed to comply with PD 53 and were in many respects time‑barred; for these reasons the court directed that the claim be struck out.