Macintosh Village (Management) Limited, R (on the application of) v Manchester City Council

The claimant sought judicial review of the planning authority's decision to grant permission for a 55-storey student accommodation tower with a reconfigured multi-storey car park. The court considered several judicial-review grounds: whether planning officers had materially misled committee members about the extent and duration of closures to the car park arising from crane assembly/operation; whether the Amended Environmental Statement (AES) was legally inadequate under the Town and Country Planning (Environmental Impact Assessment) Regulations 2017 for failing to assess risk to car-park users from contaminated dust; whether the Council breached its public-sector equality duty under section 149 of the Equality Act 2010 in relation to disabled parking provision; whether consultation obligations under regulation 25/26 of the 2017 Regulations and common-law Sedley principles were observed; and whether private third-party rights to park (RRPs) which might be enforced by injunction rendered the scheme undeliverable such that officers misdirected members.

The court applied the Mansell/Lindblom principles on officer advice read benevolently, the Blewett/Gillespie principles on environmental statements and deferral of assessment, and the Hotak/Brown/Gathercole authorities on the Public Sector Equality Duty. On each ground the judge found no public-law defect: officer statements and the planning conditions (notably FPC11 and FPC44) did not materially mislead members about intermittent safety-based closures; the AES adequately considered receptors including visitors and local community and proposed mitigation (dust management/CEMP) addressing car-park users; the PSED had been conscientiously discharged and conditions addressed disabled access (FPC31, FPC11/FPC44); consultation obligations were not breached because MVML missed the prescribed 30-day deadline for the AES consultation and, in any event, officers reasonably managed timing of the officers' report and members had received the July representations; and private RRPs, while enforceable by private law, were not of themselves a material planning consideration that automatically precluded deliverability and officers gave a reasoned evaluative judgment on deliverability. The claim is dismissed.

Background and parties

The claimant, Macintosh Village (Management) Limited, represents residents with leasehold private rights to park (RRPs) at an existing 391-space multi-storey car park (MSCP) in Manchester. The defendant, Manchester City Council, granted planning permission to the interested party GMS (Parking) Limited for a 55-storey purpose-built student accommodation development involving partial demolition and reconfiguration of the MSCP to 101 spaces. The MSCP would remain operational during construction subject to safety arrangements and a management strategy required by condition.

Nature of the application

• The claimant sought judicial review of the Council's decision to grant planning permission and associated procedures and documentation, including reliance on the Officers' Report (OR), and the adequacy and consultation on the Amended Environmental Statement (AES). Relief sought was quashing of the permission and related remedies.

Procedural posture

Permission to apply for judicial review had been granted by the Court of Appeal. The matter proceeded in the Planning Court before Mr Justice Fordham; the hearing considered the substance of several agreed issues and admissibility of further evidence.

Issues framed and court's reasoning

• Cranes / access: whether officers materially misled committee members by advising that access would only be briefly restricted during crane assembly/dismantling. The court read the OR and meeting exchanges benevolently, found officers had acknowledged occasional disruption during construction, and held that planning conditions (notably FPC44 and FPC11 requiring a construction management plan and a management strategy to keep the MSCP operational) sensibly allowed narrowly tailored safety-based, minimal interruptions. No material misdirection or illegality was established.
• Dust / EIA adequacy: whether the AES failed to assess health risks to car-park users from contaminants (mercury, asbestos, PAHs). The court applied the 2017 Regulations and Blewett/Gillespie principles and held the AES, read as a whole, identified relevant receptors (including visitors and the local community), listed contaminants and specific mitigation measures and required a site-specific dust management plan and CEMP. There was no unlawful abdication or unlawful deferral of assessment and the OR properly evaluated the AES under Blewett.
• Public Sector Equality Duty (PSED): whether the Council failed to have due regard to disabled persons by deferring detailed arrangements on disabled bays. The court held the PSED had been conscientiously considered, was recorded in the OR, and that conditions (FPC31, FPC11 and FPC44) required final details of disabled bay number, layout and temporary access arrangements including disabled access, which constituted appropriate, practicable measures rather than unlawful deferral.
• Consultation under the EIA Regulations / Sedley principles: whether the Council unlawfully dealt with late responses to the AES and failed to summarise new points at committee. The court found MVML had missed the statutory 30-day consultation deadline so the representations were not "duly made" under regulation 2(1) and regulation 26 did not oblige examination of them; officers had to issue the OR five working days before the meeting and reasonably managed the matter; there was no predetermination, and the July representations had been sent to members and considered.
• "Send-a-copy" point: the claimant sought to add a ground that the Council failed to "send a copy" of the AES to statutory consultees. The court allowed de bene esse consideration but refused permission to amend, finding the statutory phrasing did not necessarily require a hard copy and, on the facts, the point was not arguable and fell within the discretion/approach in Champion.
• Private third-party rights / injunction / deliverability: whether the OR misdirected members by treating private parking rights as not a material planning consideration and by failing to consider whether enforcement (injunction) would preclude implementation (deliverability under policies H12 and EN2). The court accepted that deliverability is a material planning consideration but held that private rights are not automatically material in that way and that officers had addressed the core objections. The OR fairly and reasonably recorded the legal opinion and explained why rights would be retained and the scheme deliverable; the question of likely success of private enforcement was a matter of evaluative judgment and not a legal misdirection.

Outcome and observations

The application for judicial review was dismissed. The court admitted certain further evidence de bene esse but refused permission to amend the grounds. The judge refused permission to appeal on the injunction/deliverability point. Costs were recorded as agreed between the parties.

The application for judicial review is dismissed. The court found no material public-law error: officers did not materially mislead members about crane-related access restrictions given the content of the officers' report and the planning conditions (notably FPC11 and FPC44) which permitted only narrowly necessary safety-based interruption; the AES adequately considered receptors including car-park users and proposed mitigation (site-specific dust management plan and CEMP) so there was no unlawful abdication under the EIA Regulations; the Public Sector Equality Duty was conscientiously discharged and conditions required finalisation of disabled access details (FPC31); consultation requirements were not breached because MVML missed the statutory 30-day consultation deadline and officers reasonably managed timing of the report; and private parking rights did not amount to a legal misdirection as to deliverability because officers fairly evaluated the matter and deliverability required evaluative planning judgment rather than an assessment of private-law litigation outcomes.