The Chief Constable of West Midlands Police, R (on the application of) v Police Misconduct Panel

[2022] EWHC 3076 (Admin)

Case details

Case citations
[2022] EWHC 3076 (Admin)
Court
High Court (Administrative Court)
Judgment date
2 December 2022
Judgment text

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Subjects
Administrative law Public law Police disciplinary proceedings
Keywords
judicial review police misconduct gross misconduct final written warning dismissal sanction public law error Wednesbury unreasonableness Equality and Diversity operational dishonesty
Outcome
claim dismissed
Judicial consideration

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Summary

A misconduct panel’s classification of conduct under several professional standards does not, without more, increase its substantive gravity. Judicial review focuses on the conduct and the panel’s assessment of seriousness, not merely on the labels applied.

Gross misconduct does not automatically require dismissal. The panel must assess seriousness, consider the purposes of the disciplinary regime, and select the least severe sanction that adequately fulfils those purposes while protecting the public interest. An Administrative Court reviewing sanction must identify a public law error; it must not conduct an undue-leniency appeal or substitute its own assessment of weight.

Factual background

A police misconduct panel found that a police sergeant had fabricated an account of discriminatory conduct involving a transgender colleague during an internal job interview. It found breaches of Honesty and Integrity, Discreditable Conduct, and, tenuously, Authority, Respect and Courtesy, but not Equality and Diversity. The conduct was found to constitute gross misconduct, for which the panel imposed a final written warning rather than dismissal.

The Chief Constable sought judicial review, challenging the findings under the professional standards, the assessment of culpability, harm, aggravating and mitigating factors, and the sanction. The central issues were whether the panel had committed public law error and whether its decision was irrational.

Held

  1. Ground 1 dismissed. Under regulations 3 and 33 of the Police (Conduct) Regulations 2012, the panel had to assess the conduct itself. The fact that one episode could fall within several standards did not inevitably increase its gravity. It was reasonably open to the panel to find that the fabricated example did not amount to direct discrimination under section 13 of the Equality Act 2010, because the transgender officer had not been treated less favourably in reality and had not been made aware of the lie. It was also open to the panel to regard the breach of Authority, Respect and Courtesy as tenuous.
  2. Ground 2 dismissed. The panel had followed the required framework for assessing seriousness: culpability, harm, aggravating factors and mitigating factors. Its findings that culpability and potential harm were medium, that there were no additional aggravating factors, and that the episode’s brevity and the officer’s remorse were mitigating factors were matters of evaluative judgment supported by the evidence. The panel had considered the risks to colleagues, the transgender officer, the force and public confidence. The challenge amounted to disagreement with the weight given to those matters.
  3. Ground 3 dismissed. The sanction process required three stages: assessing seriousness, considering the purpose of sanctions, and selecting the sanction that most appropriately fulfilled that purpose. Gross misconduct did not compel dismissal under regulations 35(1)(a) and 35(3)(b) of the Police (Conduct) Regulations 2012. The panel cogently explained why a final written warning was sufficient to maintain public confidence, uphold standards, deter misconduct and protect the public.
  4. The Administrative Court could interfere only for a public law error or on classic Wednesbury grounds. The claim was dismissed.

The court’s approach to earlier authorities

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Appellate history

First-instance judicial review in the Administrative Court. Permission had been granted by Steyn J. The application for judicial review was dismissed.

Key cases cited

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Cases citing this case

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