LEHRAM CAPITAL INVESTMENTS LIMITED v SOUTHWARK CROWN COURT

Under CPR r 39.6, a company may be represented at trial by an authorised employee only with the court’s permission. Permission should ordinarily be granted unless there is a particular and sufficient reason to withhold it. Relevant considerations include the complexity of the issues and the proposed representative’s experience and position in the company.

The court may refuse permission where the proposed representative repeatedly disobeys directions, files disproportionate or irrelevant material, makes prolix or distracting submissions, attacks other participants, and lacks a genuine understanding of the legal issues. Litigants in person remain subject to the rules and orders of the court. A stay of enforcement requires a real risk of irreparable harm.

The claimant company sought judicial review of Southwark Crown Court’s dismissal of its appeal against convictions imposed by a magistrates’ court. The convictions concerned offences under the Fraud Act and the Companies Act 2006. The claimant was fined and ordered to pay costs.

At a case management conference, the court considered whether Maria Sokolova should be permitted to represent the company, whether enforcement should be stayed, whether costs should be ordered at that stage, and whether disclosure orders should be made against the Crown Court or the interested party.

1. Representation. Applying CPR r 39.6(b), permission was refused. The court adopted the approach formerly stated in PD39A: permission should ordinarily be granted unless there is some particular and sufficient reason to withhold it. The relevant evidence was inadequate, but the court assumed, without deciding, that Ms Sokolova had been authorised or was an employee.
2. The history of the litigation supplied a particular and sufficient reason for refusal. Ms Sokolova had failed to comply with orders and directions, filed thousands of pages of disproportionate and irrelevant material, repeated applications and submissions, made personal attacks on those representing the interested party, and failed to focus on the issues. The court was also not satisfied that she understood the legal submissions she sought to make or could meaningfully assist the court.
3. The general rules of court apply equally to represented and unrepresented parties. Lack of legal representation may justify practical allowances, but it does not ordinarily justify a lower standard of compliance: Barton v Wright Hassall Llp [2018] 1 WLR 1119. Ms Sokolova’s reliance on Campaign to Protect Rural England (Kent Branch) v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2021] 1 WLR 4168 was misconceived and irrelevant to the costs issue.
4. The application for a stay of enforcement was refused. Although permission for judicial review had since been granted, there was little or no risk of irreparable harm, and opportunities to be heard remained available during the enforcement process.
5. No immediate costs order or disclosure order was made. The Crown Court had confirmed that the requested written order could not be located, so there was nothing to disclose. Disclosure by the interested party was unnecessary at that stage.
6. The court would not entertain further substantive submissions after circulation of the draft judgment. Draft judgments are supplied for correction of typographical errors, factual errors and ambiguities, not for reargument: R (Edwards) v Environment Agency [2008] 1 WLR 1587. The interested party was entitled to appear in the proceedings, and questions of its authority under Cypriot law were matters for a Cypriot court.

The judgment records earlier case-management directions and refusals of a stay by Griffiths J and Linden J. The present court determined the interlocutory issues arising in the judicial review proceedings.