Veronica Strain, R (on the application of) v The Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police

Where Parliament provides a specific statutory route for enforcing data-protection rights, judicial review will generally be refused if that route is adequate. An application for a compliance order, with compensation where appropriate, under the Data Protection Act 2018 was an adequate alternative remedy to judicial review of police data processing. A police intelligence report may retain information relevant to protecting life and discharging policing duties where it accurately records reported allegations, statements, observations and interactions with officers. Accuracy concerns the truth of the recorded information as a record of what was reported or observed; it does not require determination of the underlying allegations. An amended report may satisfy the requirements of fairness, adequacy, relevance, accuracy and being up to date.

The appellant challenged Greater Manchester Police’s refusal to erase an intelligence report concerning a welfare visit to her home. She alleged that the report inaccurately recorded matters relating to domestic abuse allegations, her attitude towards the police, social-media activity and a threat of self-immolation.

Permission to apply for judicial review was refused on the papers by HHJ Pearce and, following an oral renewal hearing, by HHJ Sephton KC sitting in the Administrative Court. The appellant appealed on the question whether the report arguably breached data-protection duties and whether the claim should instead be pursued through an alternative statutory remedy. The central issues were the adequacy of the statutory compliance-order remedy and the arguability of the alleged inaccuracies.

The Court of Appeal unanimously dismissed the appeal.

1. Alternative remedy. The substance of the claim concerned alleged breaches of data-protection legislation and sought deletion of personal data. Section 167 of the Data Protection Act 2018 provides a court remedy by way of a compliance order, with compensation available in appropriate circumstances. Where Parliament has created a specific procedure for enforcing particular rights, that procedure should generally be used instead of judicial review. Judicial review is a specialised public-law procedure and is not normally suitable for resolving factual disputes of this kind.
2. The same principle had been recognised in R (Hussain) v Secretary of State for Justice [2016] EWCA Civ 1111, reported at [2017] 1 WLR 761, in relation to the earlier statutory data-protection regime. That principle applied by analogy to the 2018 Act. The statutory compliance-order and compensation remedies were adequate, and no exceptional circumstances justified judicial review.
3. Arguability and accuracy. The amended intelligence report accurately recorded that allegations of domestic abuse had been made by both parties, that there had been no successful prosecution, that the appellant had complained about the police response, that she had said she intended to set fire to herself, and that she had posted a still image of the police visit. The court was not required to determine the truth of the underlying domestic-abuse allegations. It was sufficient that the report accurately recorded the information received, the statements made and the officers’ observations.
4. The report was fair, adequate, relevant, accurate and up to date. The judge’s failure expressly to refer to the GDPR was immaterial because the report satisfied those requirements. There was no sufficiently arguable public-law error, and permission to apply for judicial review would have been refused in any event.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Appeal from the refusal by HHJ Sephton KC, sitting as a High Court Judge in the Administrative Court, to grant permission to apply for judicial review. The appeal was dismissed. [2023] EWCA Civ 240.