The Reverend Paul Williamson v The Bishop of London & Ors

The Court of Appeal held that a civil proceedings order made under section 42 Senior Courts Act 1981 operates as a jurisdictional bar: where a person subject to a CPO institutes civil proceedings without first obtaining the leave of the High Court those proceedings are a nullity. The court construed section 42(1A) and (3) in light of the purpose of CPOs to protect courts and prospective defendants from vexatious litigation and to ensure leave operates as an effective pre‑institution filter. The decision applied and followed the reasoning in Seal v Chief Constable of South Wales Police (persuasive) and distinguished other contexts where permission requirements have been treated as procedural rather than jurisdictional.

Background and procedural posture

The appellant, Reverend Paul Williamson, had been the subject of a civil proceedings order (CPO) under section 42 Senior Courts Act 1981 made in 1997. He presented an employment tribunal claim on 1 April 2019 for alleged age discrimination without first obtaining leave of the High Court as required by the CPO. The employment tribunal held on 8 January 2020 that the claim was a nullity. The appellant's appeal to the Employment Appeal Tribunal was dismissed ([2022] EAT 118). This Court heard the appellant's appeal from the EAT.

Nature of the application

• The appellant sought to challenge the conclusion that proceedings presented in breach of a CPO are a nullity and argued that the requirement for leave is a procedural requirement which can be cured (for example by retrospective leave or by stay/strike out powers), not a jurisdictional condition.
• The respondents contended that section 42 imposes a substantive jurisdictional prohibition: proceedings commenced without leave are void and the High Court cannot grant retrospective leave to validate them.

Issues framed by the court

1. Whether section 42 SCA 1981 should be construed as creating a jurisdictional bar to institution of civil proceedings by a person subject to a CPO, so that proceedings brought without leave are a nullity; or
2. Whether the requirement for leave is merely procedural, allowing stays, strike out or retrospective validation in appropriate cases.

Reasoning and conclusions

The court analysed the statutory language of section 42 read in context and against its purpose: CPOs are targeted remedies for litigants who have habitually and persistently pursued vexatious proceedings and are intended to protect respondents and conserve court resources. The phrase that "no civil proceedings shall without the leave of the High Court be instituted" was treated as creating a condition precedent to institution. The Court emphasised the role of the CPO as a pre‑institution filter: allowing retrospective validation would undermine that filter, shift the onus away from the subject of the CPO, and expose respondents and courts to the very abuse the provision seeks to prevent. The Court considered Seal (section 139(2) MHA) persuasive on analogous reasoning and accepted prior authorities and policy considerations that support treating leave as jurisdictional in this context. It rejected the appellant's arguments based on employment tribunal rules, other statutory schemes and civil restraint order practice, concluding those contexts differ in purpose, wording or severity. The court therefore held the proceedings commenced in breach of the CPO were and remain a nullity and dismissed the appeal.

Wider context: The Court noted that CPOs are specially targeted and more draconian than other procedural restrictions, and that the nullity consequence is integral to their protective purpose. The court observed that where leave is required a timely application for leave will normally permit the litigant to bring meritorious claims within limitation periods and that safeguards exist in the CPO regime.

This is an appeal. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. It held that section 42 SCA 1981, read in its statutory and historical context and in light of its purpose, makes leave of the High Court a jurisdictional condition precedent to instituting civil proceedings by a person subject to a CPO; proceedings commenced without such leave are a nullity. Allowing retrospective validation would undermine the protective function of the CPO and was therefore rejected.

Appeal from the Employment Appeal Tribunal (Eady P) [2022] EAT 118, which dismissed the appellant's appeal from the Employment Tribunal (EJ McNeill KC) decision of 8 January 2020 that the 1 April 2019 employment tribunal claim was a nullity for breach of a CPO. There was an earlier High Court paper order of 24 September 2019 (the Pittaway Order) granting permission in the alternative; a subsequent separate employment tribunal claim issued on 23 January 2020 was dismissed on 22 June 2021 as out of time (no appeal).