Michala Hodge v Folkestone and Hythe District Council

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appellant's challenge to the council's review decision that she was intentionally homeless under section 191(1) of the Housing Act 1996. The court held that whether a place is "accommodation" under section 191(1) is a question of fact for the authority, subject to Wednesbury review, and that temporary supported accommodation provided under a licence may nonetheless be "accommodation" for the purposes of section 191(1). The court applied and followed the authorities in R v Hillingdon London Borough Council ex p Puhlhofer, R v Brent London Borough Council ex p Awua and Birmingham City Council v Ali, concluding that the council was entitled to find that the hostel room was accommodation, that it would have been reasonable for the appellant to continue to occupy it and that her homelessness was therefore intentional.

Background and procedural history:

The appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal with permission against HHJ Parker's dismissal of her county court appeal from Folkestone and Hythe District Council's review decision (dated 23 September 2021; the Original Decision dated 17 August 2021) that she was intentionally homeless under section 191(1) of the Housing Act 1996. The appeal was heard on 4 July 2023 and judgment was handed down on 27 July 2023.

Factual summary:

• The appellant had occupied a room in a Porchlight hostel (the "Room") under a written licence dated 3 August 2015. The licence described the accommodation as temporary supported accommodation intended to help residents move into longer-term housing; clause 8 allowed relatively short notice for ending the licence and clause 1 recorded it as an excluded licence under the Protection from Eviction Act 1977.
• The appellant left the Room on 10 August 2016 of her own accord, thereafter lived with family and later in other accommodation, and on 24 May 2021 applied to the council as homeless. It was common ground she was in priority need (pregnant).
• The council reviewed and upheld its original conclusion that she was intentionally homeless, having found she deliberately relinquished supported accommodation which would otherwise have led to an offer of secure housing and that she was capable of understanding the consequences of leaving despite a history of mental health difficulties.

Nature of the appeal and issues:

• The appellant argued (i) the Room was not "accommodation" for the purposes of section 191(1) because it was temporary supported accommodation provided under a licence, and (ii) even if it was accommodation, it had to be "settled accommodation" for the council to find intentionality (i.e. the council should have looked back to the last settled accommodation).

Court's reasoning and decision:

• The court set out the Part VII statutory scheme and relevant authorities. It held that Puhlhofer and Awua establish that the meaning of "accommodation" is a question of fact for the local housing authority and that no qualifying adjective such as "settled" is to be implied as a general requirement. Ali establishes that temporary or refuge-type accommodation can still fall within the statutory concept and emphasises the temporal element of "continue to occupy" in sections 175 and 191.
• The court found that, despite drafting imperfections in the council's Decision, the council had correctly applied the law: (a) the question whether the Room was "accommodation" was for the council; (b) the notion of "settled accommodation" is an analytical tool relevant only to causation and not a freestanding requirement; and (c) whether it was reasonable to continue to occupy the Room was for the council to decide. The council was entitled to find the Room was "accommodation", that it would have been reasonable for the appellant to continue to occupy it, and that her homelessness was a consequence of her deliberate decision to leave.

Remedy sought: The appellant sought to overturn the council's review decision and the county court's dismissal of her appeal; the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal.

Appeal dismissed. The court held that the council were entitled to conclude that the hostel room occupied under a licence was "accommodation" within the meaning of section 191(1) of the Housing Act 1996, that the concept of "settled accommodation" is an analytical tool relevant to causation rather than a free-standing requirement, and that on the facts the appellant deliberately relinquished accommodation which it would have been reasonable to continue to occupy so as to be intentionally homeless.

Appeal to the Court of Appeal (Civil Division) from the decision of HHJ Parker at Canterbury Combined Court Centre (HHJ Parker H00CT647). The council's review decision under section 202 of the Housing Act 1996 was dated 23 September 2021; the original council decision was dated 17 August 2021. Permission to appeal was granted by Arnold LJ.