Michala Hodge v Folkestone and Hythe District Council

For the purposes of Housing Act 1996, a place occupied under a licence may constitute accommodation even if it is temporary or supported. Whether a place is accommodation, and whether it would be reasonable to continue occupying it, are questions of fact for the local housing authority, subject to Wednesbury review. Accommodation need not be settled or permanent. The expression settled accommodation is a judicial tool for analysing causation, not an additional statutory condition. An authority may find intentional homelessness where an applicant deliberately leaves accommodation available for occupation which it would have been reasonable to continue occupying, and the departure causes later homelessness.

The appellant had occupied a studio room provided by a charity under a licence for temporary supported accommodation. She left voluntarily in 2016. After later becoming homeless, she applied to Folkestone and Hythe District Council for assistance.

The Council decided that she was intentionally homeless under section 191(1) of the Housing Act 1996. On review, it upheld that decision. HHJ Parker dismissed her appeal to the county court. The appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal on whether the room was accommodation for the purposes of section 191(1), and whether it had to be settled accommodation.

1. Appeal dismissed. Lady Justice Elisabeth Laing gave the judgment. Lord Justice Arnold and Sir Andrew McFarlane agreed.
2. The Court was bound by R v Hillingdon London Borough Council ex p Puhlhofer [1986] AC 484 and R v Brent London Borough Council ex p Awua [1996] AC 55. Whether a place occupied by an applicant is accommodation for section 191(1) of the Housing Act 1996 is a question of fact for the local housing authority, subject to Wednesbury review. Some places may be incapable of being accommodation as a matter of law, but occupation under a licence does not decide the issue.
3. Birmingham City Council v Ali [2009] UKHL 36; [2009] 1 WLR 1506 established that whether it is reasonable to continue occupying temporary accommodation is also a question of fact for the authority, subject to Wednesbury review.
4. Awua establishes that accommodation need not be settled or permanent. Settled accommodation is a judicial gloss used, where useful, to analyse whether a causal link exists between earlier accommodation and later homelessness. It is not an additional statutory requirement for accommodation under Part VII.
5. The Council was entitled to find that the room was accommodation, that the appellant deliberately left it, and that it would have been reasonable for her to continue occupying it. It was therefore entitled to conclude that she became intentionally homeless. On these facts, the Council needed to decide only whether the room was accommodation and whether it would have been reasonable to continue occupying it; it was unnecessary to decide separately whether the room was settled accommodation.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): dismissed the appeal and upheld the Council’s decision that the appellant was intentionally homeless. [2023] EWCA Civ 896
• Canterbury Combined Court Centre: HHJ Parker dismissed the appellant’s appeal from the Council’s review decision dated 23 September 2021.
• Folkestone and Hythe District Council: decided on review that the appellant was intentionally homeless under section 191(1) of the Housing Act 1996.