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X v Transcription Agency and Master James

[2023] EWHC 1092 (KB)

Case details

Neutral citation
[2023] EWHC 1092 (KB)
Court
High Court
Judgment date
9 May 2023
Subjects
Data protectionCivil procedureJudicial independence
Keywords
subject access requestData Protection Act 2018UK GDPRjudicial exemptionSchedule 2 paragraph 14closed material procedureArticle 15judicial independencetranscriptiontimeliness
Outcome
other

Case summary

The claimant issued subject access requests under the UK GDPR and the Data Protection Act 2018 (DPA 2018) to obtain personal data held by a court costs judge and by a transcription firm. Both defendants refused disclosure relying principally on the statutory judicial exemption in paragraph 14 of Part 2 of Schedule 2 to the DPA 2018. The court held that paragraph 14 may be given a broad construction: personal data processed by an individual "acting in a judicial capacity" or by a court in its judicial capacity are exempt, and other personal data are also exempt to the extent disclosure would be likely to prejudice judicial independence.

Having inspected closed material in confidential sessions, the judge concluded that the contested material related to the judge's conduct of costs proceedings and to the production and approval of transcripts and was therefore processed in a judicial capacity. The court also held that it has power to consider material relied upon as exempt in closed session and applied procedural safeguards. The claimant's challenge was dismissed, and the complaint about delay in the judge's reply to the subject access request was not established or, if there was a short delay, judged trivial.

Case abstract

This is a first instance claim under the DPA 2018 and the UK GDPR by an individual who sought his personal data from (1) a provider of court transcription services and (2) a High Court Master who sat as a Costs Judge. The claimant’s requests arose from related High Court litigation and a subsequent complaint to the Judicial Conduct Investigations Office. Both defendants relied on the judicial exemption (Schedule 2, para 14, DPA 2018) and the first defendant also relied on the third party exemption. The claimant alleged failure to follow recommended procedural steps before asserting exemptions, that the judge’s response was late and that some withheld material was not judicial in nature.

Issues for decision:

  • Scope of the judicial exemption: whether data processed by a judge or court in relation to transcript production and case management fall within para 14(2) or, alternatively, are exempt under para 14(3) because disclosure would prejudice judicial independence.
  • Procedure: whether the court may inspect material claimed to be exempt in closed session absent the claimant and his lawyers and the appropriate procedural safeguards.
  • Application to the facts: whether the withheld material in the closed bundles was judicially processed.
  • Timeliness: whether the judge replied to the subject access request within one month.

Reasoning and outcome:

  • The court gave a broad interpretation of "acting in a judicial capacity" consistent with the EU GDPR context and CJEU authority (X v Autoriteit Persoonsgegevens). The scope covers judicial tasks beyond the mere production of final judgments, including case management and tasks connected to approval of transcripts.
  • There is an implied power in the court to inspect material claimed as exempt and to do so in closed sessions where necessary; the BUAV/Browning approach to closed material was followed with safeguards (short closed sessions, counsel subject to duties to the court, gisting for the excluded party, etc.).
  • On the evidence (including the first defendant's witness and the judge's closed material confirmation), the material related to the costs proceedings and transcript production and therefore fell within para 14(2); alternatively disclosure would likely prejudice judicial independence under para 14(3). The claimant failed to displace the defendants' case.
  • The claimant did not prove that the judge’s response was outside the one‑month period; any short delay would have been trivial and not warrant relief.

The claim was dismissed in respect of both defendants.

Held

The claim is dismissed. The court held that the judicial exemption in paragraph 14 of Part 2 of Schedule 2 to the DPA 2018 may be given a broad meaning and covers personal data processed in connection with judicial tasks such as case management and approval of transcripts; the court has power to consider material claimed to be exempt in closed session and the closed material in this case showed the defendants processed the claimant’s data in a judicial capacity (or, alternatively, that disclosure would likely prejudice judicial independence). The claimant did not demonstrate an actionable late reply by the judge or any procedural error requiring relief.

Cited cases

Legislation cited

  • Civil Procedure Rules: Rule 39.9 – CPR 39.9 (recording and transcripts of hearings)
  • Data Protection Act 1998: Section 15(2)
  • Data Protection Act 2018: Section 10 – s10
  • Data Protection Act 2018: section 3(2) and (3)
  • Data Protection Act 2018: Part 2 of Schedule 2, paragraph 14 (judicial exemption)
  • Data Protection Act 2018: Part 2 of Schedule 2, paragraph 16 (third party exemption)
  • Data Protection Act 2018: Part 2 of Schedule 2, paragraph 6
  • Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (EU GDPR): Recital 20 of Regulation 2016/679
  • UK GDPR: Article 12(3) (time limit for replies to data subject requests)
  • UK GDPR: Article 15 (Right of access by the data subject)
  • UK GDPR: Article 9(1) (special category data)