Dwaine Campbell, R (on the application of) v London Borough of Ealing

This judicial review challenged the Defendant's decision of 28 February 2022 to withdraw funding for the Claimant's bed and breakfast temporary accommodation. Central legal issues were the interaction between duties under the Care Act 2014 (in particular the scope of powers to meet care and support needs and the exception in section 23) and duties under the Housing Act 1996, and whether the withdrawal amounted to unlawful victimisation under the Equality Act 2010.

The court found (i) the Care Act requires a sequential approach of assessment and, where eligible needs are identified, meeting them under sections 9, 13, 18 and related provisions, but section 23 prevents meeting needs by doing anything the authority is required to do under the Housing Act; (ii) where housing duties under the Housing Act apply, the Care Act does not permit a local authority to bypass the Housing Act allocation and homelessness scheme to meet accommodation needs; and (iii) on the facts the Defendant was required to address the Claimant's housing needs through its Housing Act scheme, so it had no duty or power under the Care Act to fund the Claimant's accommodation and the decision to withdraw funding was not irrational.

The court also rejected the Claimant's victimisation complaint under section 27 of the Equality Act 2010, finding that the decision to withdraw funding was not significantly influenced by the bringing of county court proceedings and that the stated purpose — to encourage the Claimant to pursue housing options — was supported by the contemporaneous evidence.

This is a judicial review of the London Borough of Ealing's decision to end funding for the Claimant's bed and breakfast temporary accommodation, after more than five years of funding. The Claimant, partially sighted with progressive retinal disease and mental health issues, contended that he had ongoing eligible needs under the Care Act 2014 which required provision (or funding) of accommodation to enable effective delivery of care and support. He alleged (Ground 1) that the local authority wrongly concluded it had no duty to provide or fund accommodation under the Care Act or failed properly to assess that question; (Ground 2(a)) that the decision was irrational and procedurally flawed; (Ground 2(b)) that it was taken for an improper purpose; and (Ground 2(c)) that it amounted to victimisation contrary to section 27 of the Equality Act 2010. Permission for judicial review had been granted previously.

The court framed key issues as: (i) whether the Care Act permitted the Defendant to meet the Claimant's accommodation needs by funding his temporary accommodation given the overlapping housing duties under the Housing Act 1996; (ii) whether the Defendant had erred in assessment or acted irrationally in withdrawing funding; and (iii) whether the withdrawal constituted victimisation under the Equality Act.

On the first issue the judge analysed the statutory scheme: duties to carry out needs assessments (section 9), determine eligibility (section 13/2015 Regulations), meet eligible needs (section 18), and the express exception in section 23 that a local authority "may not meet needs under sections 18-20 by doing anything which it ... is required to do under the Housing Act 1996." The court followed the reasoning in Idolo that section 23 gives priority to the Housing Act scheme where housing duties are engaged. The Claimant's reliance on Aburas (the "accommodation plus" concept) was considered but the judge concluded that any extension of that approach so as to override section 23 was obiter and not followed. Applying the scheme, the Claimant was found to have been within the Housing Act regime (on the housing register, Band B, and eligible under Part VI or Part VII) so that the Defendant had no duty or power under the Care Act to fund his accommodation.

On assessment and rationality, the court held that previous care assessments had been undertaken and, although a further assessment after withdrawal of funding would be appropriate in practice, the Defendant's decision was not irrational and a pre-decision repeat assessment was not required in the circumstances (the Claimant was given eight weeks' notice and funding remained in place pending proceedings).

On the Equality Act victimisation point, the Claimant's county court proceedings were accepted as a protected act, and withdrawal of funding was a detriment; but the judge accepted the Defendant's evidence (absent cross-examination and not contradicted by contemporaneous documents) that the decision aimed to encourage the Claimant to pursue housing options and was not taken in retaliation. The claim of victimisation and improper purpose therefore failed.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The application for judicial review is dismissed. The court held that section 23 of the Care Act 2014 prevents a local authority from meeting accommodation needs by doing what it is required to do under the Housing Act 1996; because the Claimant's housing needs fell within the Housing Act regime the Defendant had no duty or power under the Care Act to fund the temporary accommodation. The withdrawal of funding was not irrational and did not constitute victimisation under the Equality Act 2010, the court accepting the Defendant's contemporaneous evidence of legitimate purpose.