Dwaine Campbell, R (on the application of) v London Borough of Ealing

Accommodation is not itself a need for care and support under the Care Act 2014. Accommodation may nevertheless be provided where it is necessary to deliver care and support for an independently established care need. That power is subject to section 23: where the housing need is required to be addressed under the Housing Act 1996, the Care Act cannot be used to bypass the housing allocation or homelessness schemes. A local authority may therefore withdraw Care Act funding for accommodation where the claimant’s housing needs fall within those schemes, although it must consider whether withdrawal creates additional care and support needs. For victimisation, the protected act must have significantly influenced the detriment. In judicial review proceedings, unchallenged evidence from a public body should generally be accepted unless documentary evidence shows that it cannot be correct.

The claimant, a disabled adult with eligible care and support needs, challenged Ealing’s decision to end funding for his temporary bed and breakfast accommodation. He argued that the Care Act 2014 required continued accommodation funding or a further assessment, and that the decision was irrational, taken for an improper purpose, and amounted to victimisation under section 27 of the Equality Act 2010.

Ealing contended that the claimant’s accommodation needs fell within the Housing Act 1996 schemes. The central issues were whether section 23 of the Care Act prevented accommodation funding under the Care Act, whether further assessment was required before withdrawal, and whether the decision was materially influenced by the claimant’s discrimination proceedings.

The claim was dismissed.

1. Care Act and accommodation. A standalone need for accommodation is not a need for care and support. Accommodation may be provided under the Care Act where it is necessary to deliver care and support for a separate looked-after need. That principle does not permit the Care Act to circumvent section 23.
2. Priority of the Housing Act scheme. Following Idolo, section 23 gives a measure of priority to the general housing scheme. Housing needs identified through care assessment must be dealt with within the Housing Act’s system of competing priorities. The claimant’s inclusion on Ealing’s Part VI housing register, his Band B priority, and the applicable allocation scheme meant that Ealing was required to address his housing needs under the Housing Act. The absence of accommodation having yet been provided did not alter that conclusion.
3. Effect on the Care Act grounds. Ealing consequently had no Care Act duty or power to provide or fund the claimant’s accommodation. Its conclusion was not legally erroneous or irrational. A further assessment was nevertheless appropriate in principle because withdrawal might generate additional care and support needs, including enhanced assistance with information, advice and advocacy. The failure to complete that assessment before the decision did not make the decision unlawful, particularly given the eight-week notice and the continued funding at the relevant time.
4. Victimisation and improper purpose. The claimant’s County Court discrimination proceedings were a protected act. Withdrawal of funding was a detriment. However, the evidence, read as a whole, showed that the decision was intended to encourage use of Housing Act routes and was not significantly influenced by the protected act. The claim under section 27 of the Equality Act therefore failed. The same evidence established a proper purpose.
5. Evidence in judicial review. As there had been no application to cross-examine the relevant witness, her evidence had to be accepted unless it could not be correct. The documents did not meet that high threshold.