Mohamed Amersi v Charlotte Leslie & Anor.

Each discrete defamatory publication creates a separate cause of action. A claimant complaining of publications to identified individuals must particularise and establish serious reputational harm attributable to each publication. Harm from different publications cannot be aggregated to satisfy that requirement.

Inference remains an evidential method. Its foundations must be proved or inherently probable. Limited publication and available evidence from recipients may substantially restrict the scope for inference. Consequential republication damage cannot rescue an original publication which fails the serious harm threshold.

Permission to amend requires a coherent, particularised claim supported by evidence showing realistic prospects of success. Speculation that favourable evidence might emerge through cross-examination at trial is insufficient. A further opportunity to plead may be refused where there is no realistic prospect of curing the substantive defect or where further proceedings would contravene proportionate case management.

Mohamed Amersi, a businessman and philanthropist, founded Conservative Friends of the Middle East and North Africa Limited, known as COMENA. Charlotte Leslie was managing director of CMEC UK & MENA Limited, which operated the Conservative Middle East Council. Amersi sued both defendants over memoranda Leslie circulated concerning his background, conduct and proposed organisation.

The named recipients included former ministers Sir David Lidington and Sir Alan Duncan; Sir Julian Lewis, chairman of the Intelligence and Security Committee; Crispin Blunt MP; Ben Elliot, co-chairman of the Conservative Party; and Sheikh Fawaz, Bahrain's ambassador to the United Kingdom. Amersi alleged serious reputational harm through those publications and wider dissemination.

A separate data protection claim had been discontinued. In the libel proceedings, claims concerning unidentified recipients were stayed, and Amersi was required to seek permission to particularise serious harm. The court considered his amendment application and the defendants' application to strike out the original, composite pleading of serious harm.

1. Permission to amend was refused. The defendants' strike-out application succeeded, and the claim was brought to an end. The proposed amendments failed substantively because the evidence disclosed no realistic prospect of establishing serious harm from the publications complained of.

2. Under CPR 17.3, proposed amendments must be intelligible, coherent and properly particularised. They must have evidential support satisfying the summary judgment merits test. The court could evaluate assertions against contemporaneous documents without conducting a mini-trial. A claimant relying on evidence expected at trial must identify a reason for expecting it. Hoping to obtain favourable admissions by compelling or cross-examining unwilling recipients was insufficient.

3. Section 1 of the Defamation Act 2013 requires proof of actual or likely serious reputational harm. The inquiry concerns the effect of the allegations on recipients, rather than their gravity alone or subsequent adverse action. Applying Banks v Cadwalladr, [2023] EWCA Civ 219, each discrete publication required its own serious harm case. The pragmatic collective assessment available for mass publication did not permit aggregation across these separate publications to identified individuals.

4. Inference must rest on evidence and inherent probabilities. Publication to a small number of identified recipients usually permits examination of its actual impact. The absence of a recipient's witness statement was not automatically fatal, but contemporaneous documents must then provide a credible evidential basis. Evidence of political disagreement, irritation, further checks or forwarding a memorandum did not itself establish serious reputational harm.

5. Consequential republication damage under Slipper v BBC, [1991] 1 QB 283, depended on an actionable original publication. Serious harm suffered in a subsequent recipient's eyes could not cure failure to establish it in the original recipient's eyes. A claim imposing separate liability for republication required proof of the elements and serious harm of that separate publication. Whether such liability required intention or authorisation was left open.

6. The evidence concerning all six named recipients failed the merits test. Direct evidence and contemporaneous documents undermined the proposed inferences, and no material factual dispute or realistic prospect of improved evidence justified trial. Wider dissemination evidence also failed to establish serious harm causally connected to a publication sued upon, although that additional assessment was unnecessary once the original claims failed. An approved unsigned witness statement was admissible hearsay; unidentified hearsay sources affected evidential weight.

7. The original serious harm pleading was struck out under CPR Part 3.4(2)(a). No further opportunity to plead was justified because the claimant had presented his best evidential case. Independently, his conduct and disproportionate use of resources made further proceedings inconsistent with CPR 1.1. The court did not determine abuse of process through collateral purpose or the disputed power to require disclosure of full litigation costs.

• High Court, King's Bench Division: In the present judgment, permission to amend was refused, the original serious harm pleading was struck out, and the claim was brought to an end.
• High Court: On 27 June 2022, claims concerning unidentified recipients were stayed. The claimant was required to apply, with supporting evidence, to particularise serious harm concerning named recipients. The disclosure, preliminary issues and variation applications were adjourned generally.
• High Court: In separate related data protection proceedings, Tipples J transferred the claim from Part 8 to Part 7 on 23 November 2021 because of substantial factual disputes. The claimant discontinued that claim on 28 March 2022, with an agreed order making no order for costs.