Edwin Afriyie v The Commissioner of Police for the City Of London
[2023] EWHC 1632 (KB)
Case details
Case summary
The claimant brought claims for assault, battery and misfeasance in public office following his arrest and the discharge of a conducted energy device ('taser'). The court applied the statutory and common law tests for police use of force, in particular the powers in the Criminal Law Act 1967 s.3 and Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 s.117, and the Authorised Professional Practice guidance on taser use. The judge found, on the evidence (notably the body-worn video), that the officers honestly believed force was necessary, that those beliefs were objectively reasonable, and that the level of force used (including the taser discharge and subsequent handcuffing) was no more than reasonably required and proportionate in the rapidly evolving circumstances.
Because the force used was lawful, the misfeasance in public office claim failed. The court also considered fundamental dishonesty under the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 s.57, rejected the defendant's allegations that the claimant had been fundamentally dishonest on matters going to the heart of the claim, and therefore did not dismiss the claim under s.57. Having decided liability against the claimant on the merits, the judge dismissed the claimant's claims. The judgment includes worked assessments of the damages that would have been awarded had liability been established.
Case abstract
Background and procedural history: The claimant, a social worker, was stopped by City of London police in the early hours of 7 April 2018. Following repeated unsuccessful breathalyser attempts he was arrested for failure to provide a specimen. During the arrest PC Pringle discharged a taser; the claimant fell and struck his head. The claimant sued in assault, battery and misfeasance in public office. The claim was re-tried in May 2023 after an earlier hearing was not concluded by a judge who became ill.
Relief sought: Damages for assault and battery (including for unlawful handcuffing and tasering), misfeasance in public office, and damages for physical and psychiatric injury. The defendant sought dismissal under s.57 Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 for alleged fundamental dishonesty.
Issues before the court:
- Whether the officers' threatened and actual uses of force (handcuffing, taser discharge, and post-taser restraint) were lawful and proportionate under the Criminal Law Act 1967 s.3 and PACE 1984 s.117 and self-defence principles;
- Whether the misfeasance in public office tort was made out;
- Whether the claimant had been fundamentally dishonest under CJCA 2015 s.57; and
- If liability were made out, what damages would have been appropriate for the claimed physical and psychiatric injuries (quantum).
Evidence and reasoning: The court placed significant weight on contemporaneous body-worn video and witness statements. On handcuffing at arrest the judge accepted that an objectively reasonable belief that handcuffs were necessary to prevent a violent breach of the peace had arisen (Lockley and related authorities), so the threatened use did not amount to assault and any immediate force to effect the arrest was reasonable. On taser use the court analysed the officers' state of mind and objective circumstances: the claimant was large, agitated, had resisted officers' attempts to control him, had thrown his watch, repeatedly ignored demands to put his hands out, and had shouted that he would not allow the arrest. The judge found PC Pringle honestly believed, and had an objectively reasonable basis to believe, that a significant physical threat existed and that further physical engagement would be required, making taser discharge proportionate and necessary in the rapidly evolving facts; alternative options (PAVA spray or patience) were considered but did not make taser use unreasonable on the facts. Post-discharge handcuffing was also found to be reasonable on the grounds of officer and claimant safety.
Misfeasance: Because the use of force was lawful, the misfeasance claim failed.
Fundamental dishonesty: The court considered multiple alleged instances of dishonesty. Some peripheral inconsistencies were found but the judge concluded the defendant had not proved fundamental dishonesty on matters going to the root of the claim (applying the authorities on s.57 and the Ivey/Genting test). Accordingly the s.57 dismissal remedy did not arise.
Disposition: The claimant's claims for assault, battery and misfeasance in public office were dismissed on the merits. The judgment sets out the sums that would have been awarded on various heads of loss had liability been made out (including provisional figures for head injury, chest puncture wounds, and psychiatric injury).
Held
Cited cases
- Lockley, (1864) 4 F & F 155 positive
- Bibby v Chief Constable of Essex Police, (2000) 164 JP 297 positive
- Reed v Wastie, [1972] Crim LR 221 neutral
- Thompson v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, [1998] QB 498 positive
- Three Rivers District Council v Governor and Company of the Bank of England (No 3), [2003] 2 AC 1 positive
- Roberts v Chief Constable of Kent Police, [2008] EWCA Civ 1588 neutral
- Ashley v Chief Constable of Sussex Police, [2008] UKHL 25 positive
- McCarthy v Chief Constable of Merseyside Police, [2016] EWCA Civ 1257 positive
- Ivey v Genting Casinos Limited, [2017] UKSC 67 positive
- London Organising Committee of the Olympic and Paralympic Games v Sinfield, [2018] EWHC 51 positive
- Cameron v Chief Constable of the Police Service of Northern Ireland, [2020] NIQB 75 positive
- Cojanu v Essex Partnership NHS Trust, [2022] EWHC 197 (QB) neutral
- Jenkinson v Robertson, [2022] EWHC 791 positive
Legislation cited
- Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015: Section 57
- Criminal Law Act 1967: Section 3 – s.3
- Firearms Act 1968: Section 5(1)(b) – s.5(1)(b)
- Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984: Section 117 – s.117