Robin Simon Graham Makin v Ministry of Justice

Anonymity orders are derogations from the fundamental principle of open justice. They may be granted or continued only in exceptional circumstances, where anonymity is strictly necessary and supported by clear and cogent evidence. The court must balance the private and Convention rights relied upon against the public interest in open justice and the proper administration of justice. A court may revisit its own order where circumstances have materially changed or later events have diminished the basis for the order. The passage of time, the attainment of adulthood by affected children, subsequent serious professional misconduct, and the public interest in regulatory investigation may justify lifting anonymity. Protecting confidential or suppressed material does not necessarily require continued anonymity, since tailored restrictions can prevent disclosure of that material.

The claimant had obtained anonymity in 2014 proceedings against the Ministry of Justice concerning documents connected with his wife’s death and subject access requests. The order was later extended to related costs proceedings, further litigation, and an extended civil restraint order.

The Ministry applied under CPR Part 3.1(7) to revisit and remove the anonymity order. It relied on the passage of time, the claimant’s adult children, serious findings of misconduct in subsequent costs proceedings, the public interest in regulatory investigation, and the effect of anonymity on the administration of justice. The claimant relied on his family’s Article 8 rights, health-related concerns, and the sensitive documents that had originally prompted anonymity. The central issue was whether continued anonymity remained necessary.

1. Application granted. The court had jurisdiction under CPR Part 3.1(7) to revisit the 2014 anonymity order. The recognised grounds included a material change of circumstances and subsequent events which had removed or diminished the basis on which the original order was made.
2. Open justice was the starting point. Anonymity was permissible only exceptionally, where it was strictly necessary to secure the proper administration of justice, and the burden lay on the person seeking it to provide clear and cogent evidence. The court had to balance the claimant’s and his family’s Article 8 rights, any Article 10 interests, and the public interest in transparent justice and reporting.
3. The public interest weighed very heavily against continuation. The claimant was a solicitor, officer of the court and higher rights advocate. The serious misconduct findings in the costs proceedings, including improper courtroom behaviour, misleading conduct in an injunction application, persistent meritless allegations of bias, and egregious overcharging, created a substantial public interest in effective investigation by the SRA and SDT. An extended civil restraint order also supported the conclusion that anonymity hampered the administration of justice.
4. The evidence relied upon for continued anonymity was insufficient. The children were adults, the underlying events were almost 20 years old, and no evidence was supplied by other family members. The original judgment and subsequent judgments had avoided disclosing the sensitive material, so lifting anonymity would not itself reveal it. The claimant’s health condition and the possible stigma associated with it did not outweigh the public interests, particularly as the material had not been properly deployed in the earlier misconduct proceedings.
5. Anonymity was a binary protection across the connected proceedings. It could not remain in place for some judgments or orders while being lifted in others. The court therefore directed the parties to draw up an order lifting anonymity throughout, while preserving restrictions preventing disclosure of the sensitive material which the claimant had previously sought to suppress.

This was a first-instance decision on the Ministry of Justice’s application to remove an anonymity order. The judgment records related procedural decisions, including Murray J’s dismissal of permission applications in [2023] EWHC 72, but no appeal from the present decision is stated.