Payone GmbH v Jerry Kofi Logo

Strike out is a remedy of last resort. The court must be satisfied that the claim or defence is bound to fail, and should consider whether amendment or another proportionate course can cure the defect. Abuse of process includes relitigating matters that could and should have been raised earlier, duplicating proceedings, and pursuing claims where the likely benefit is wholly disproportionate to the resources required. A litigant in person remains subject to the Civil Procedure Rules. A defence to a claim protecting confidential information must identify a legally relevant connection between the asserted matters and the claimant’s right to protection. Where a counterclaim may have a viable basis, it should be preserved in a properly pleaded and appropriately limited form.

Payone GmbH sought to strike out a document filed by its former employee, Jerry Kofi Logo, which he contended should operate as a defence and counterclaim to proceedings seeking a permanent injunction protecting confidential information. The document combined witness evidence, purported defences and numerous counterclaims concerning employment, data handling, pensions, health and safety, grievance procedures and other matters. The court considered whether the document disclosed reasonable grounds, amounted to an abuse of process or obstructed the just disposal of the proceedings, and whether any viable claim should instead be permitted by amendment.

1. Strike-out principles. Rule 3.4(2) of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 applied. Strike out is generally a remedy of last resort. The court must consider whether the defect can be cured by amendment and should not strike out unless the claim or defence is bound to fail. Where abuse is alleged, proportionality and the overriding objective are central.
2. The defendant’s witness statement was not a CPR-compliant defence or counterclaim. It mixed evidence with pleading, was frequently incoherent, and failed to explain why the matters relied upon answered the claim for protection of confidential information. The claimant’s alleged failures concerning mobile-phone use, an Apple ID, policies, recordings and photographs did not provide a legally relevant defence to the claimant’s proprietary or confidence-based rights.
3. The defendant’s public-interest and whistleblowing arguments did not disclose a reasonable defence. The interim order already permitted disclosure to specified regulators and retention of defined documents for existing Employment Tribunal and County Court proceedings. Delay did not realistically undermine the claim, and the Employment Tribunal’s obiter conclusion concerning a Polkey remedy had no connection with the protection of confidential information.
4. Several proposed counterclaims were abusive, duplicative, legally incoherent, disproportionate, estopped, or within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Employment Tribunal. The court applied the principles concerning res judicata and disproportionate litigation identified in Jameel v Dow Jones and Co.
5. The pension counterclaim was different. The claimant accepted that the defendant had not been enrolled in a pension scheme, and the court could not be satisfied that every aspect of a claim for resulting investment loss was bound to fail or was abusive. The witness statement was struck out in its entirety, but the defendant was permitted to file a counterclaim limited to paragraphs 183 and 197(c) of the revised witness statement. The claimant was permitted to serve a defence within 14 days.

This was a first-instance decision. The judgment records that Linden J had previously granted an interim injunction, but no appellate decision is stated.