Gabriel Clarke-Holland, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department & Anor

The claimants sought judicial review of the Home Office decision to adopt an "Emergency Statement" and to use Class Q of Part 19 of the Town and Country Planning (General Permitted Development) (England) Order 2015 to bring decommissioned Ministry of Defence sites at Wethersfield and Scampton into use for asylum accommodation. The court considered (i) the correct legal meaning of "emergency" in Class Q; (ii) the lawfulness of the Secretary of State for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities' screening directions under regulation 5 of the Town and Country Planning (Environmental Impact Assessment) Regulations 2017; (iii) compliance with the Public Sector Equality Duty under section 149 of the Equality Act 2010; and (iv) value for money and whether materially relevant accounting information was omitted.

The court held that the statutory definition of "emergency" in paragraph Q.2 is comprehensive and that an ongoing situation threatening serious damage to human welfare (including homelessness) falls within it; on the facts the Secretary of State lawfully relied on Class Q. The screening directions lawfully treated the screened "project" as the Class Q 12‑month deployment of temporary modular units: the likely longer‑term use of the sites was inchoate and contingent, so the decision to screen the 12‑month project was not Wednesbury irrational and cumulative effects need not be assessed in detail at that stage. The Equality Impact Assessments were not unlawfully deferred in substance: the duty was discharged by a proportionate, experience‑informed and continuing assessment. The value‑for‑money challenge failed because the omitted detail was not so obviously material as to render the decision irrational. The judicial review claims were dismissed.

This is a first‑instance judicial review challenge to the Home Office's announcement (29 March 2023) that two former Ministry of Defence sites (RAF Wethersfield and RAF Scampton) would be used to accommodate asylum seekers. Claimants were the two local planning authorities (Braintree District Council and West Lindsey District Council) and a local resident. Defendants were the Secretary of State for the Home Department and, in one claim, the Secretary of State for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities; the Secretary of State for Defence was an interested party.

The claimants sought relief challenging:

• the legal basis for relying on Class Q (Part 19) permitted development rights via an "Emergency Statement";
• screening directions under regulation 5 of the EIA Regulations that the proposed development was not EIA development (the directions treated the project as a 12‑month temporary scheme);
• compliance with the public sector equality duty and the content/timing of Equalities Impact Assessments; and
• the Secretary of State's attention to value for money and accounting officer advice.

The court first construed Class Q and concluded the statutory definition of "emergency" (Q.2) is exhaustive for the Class Q context and may include situations developing over time as well as sudden events; it can include a situation threatening homelessness of asylum seekers. Applying that meaning to the facts, and having regard to the Home Office's statutory duty to provide accommodation and the contemporaneous evidence of record levels of asylum seekers and the unsustainability of hotels, the court concluded reliance on Class Q was lawful. The court recognised that assessment of whether an emergency exists involves judgment but found that, on the evidence, the Secretary of State's judgment was lawful in outcome.

On EIA screening the court applied established principles (including authorities on project definition, salami‑slicing and cumulative effects). The screening decisions and supporting material proceeded on the basis that the Class Q scheme was a 12‑month temporary project using prefabricated modular units; although longer‑term use was contemplated in internal documents, post‑decision and post‑screening evidence was an unreliable guide to the contemporaneous understanding. Because future, longer‑term plans were inchoate and contingent on other policy developments, the decision to screen the 12‑month project and not to carry out a full cumulative assessment was not irrational.

On equality duties the court applied a proportionate standard: ministers had acknowledged significant risks to community relations, relied on prior operational experience, prepared living Equalities Impact Assessments and planned multi‑agency mitigation and engagement after announcement. The court found no unlawful deferral of the duty.

On value for money the court held that the omission of further detailed accounting officer material did not amount to irrationality because the consideration was not so obviously material that failure to take it into account was perverse, and the decision context showed ministers had been alerted to VfM risks.

Overall: the judicial review claims were dismissed; the court gave detailed reasons on interpretation of Class Q, EIA screening scope, the proper approach to post‑decision evidence and the breadth of the public sector equality duty.

The claims for judicial review are dismissed. The court held (i) the statutory definition of "emergency" in Class Q is comprehensive and can encompass an ongoing situation threatening serious damage to human welfare (including homelessness), and on the facts the Secretary of State lawfully relied on Class Q; (ii) the EIA screening directions lawfully treated the Class Q deployment as a 12‑month project and it was not irrational to defer assessment of inchoate longer‑term plans; (iii) the Public Sector Equality Duty was discharged by a proportionate, living assessment and planned mitigation; and (iv) the value for money challenge failed as the omitted accounting detail was not so obviously material as to make the decision irrational.