Nabeel Aga v The General Dental Council

On a statutory appeal against professional discipline, the appellate court conducts a rehearing by reanalysis of the evidence. It may correct material errors of fact or law and substitute its own decision, while giving appropriate respect to a specialist tribunal’s assessment of professional misconduct, insight and risk.

An immediate suspension imposed after a final suspension direction is not a separate cumulative sanction. Where both are made, the period served under the immediate order counts towards the specified suspension period. Interpreting the legislation otherwise could exceed the statutory maximum and penalise the exercise of the right of appeal.

The claimant, a registered dental practitioner, appealed against a Professional Conduct Committee decision finding that he had harassed a woman and failed to report his arrest and charge. He accepted the factual findings, impairment of fitness to practise and the appropriateness of suspension, but challenged the nine-month duration and the continuing effect of an immediate suspension order.

The principal issue was whether the Dentists Act 1984 required the immediate suspension already served to be credited against the final suspension direction, or permitted the two periods to run consecutively.

1. Appeal against sanction. The appeal court’s jurisdiction was appellate rather than supervisory. It could reanalyse the evidence, correct material errors of fact or law, and decide whether the sanction was excessive or disproportionate. Respect was due to the PCC’s specialist assessment of insight, remediation, professional standards and risk, but that respect was not absolute.
2. Sanction. The PCC was entitled to find a real risk of repetition. The sustained harassment, disregard of two police warnings or agreements, lack of meaningful insight and inadequate remediation justified the finding that the claimant remained a risk to persons whom he might pursue romantically or for marriage. The nine-month suspension was not manifestly excessive.
3. Statutory construction. Section 27B(6)(b) imposed an absolute 12-month maximum. Sections 29A and 30 supplied the timing mechanism for a suspension direction and an immediate suspension order. They did not authorise consecutive periods which increased the total suspension beyond the statutory maximum or penalised an appeal.
4. Single suspension. Where a final suspension direction and an immediate suspension order were made together, there was one suspension. Its commencement was when the immediate order took effect. When that order ceased and the direction took effect, the suspension continued rather than starting again. The PCC should word the direction so that time served under the immediate order was credited against the specified duration.
5. The suspension direction was therefore set aside. The claimant was directed to remain suspended for a total of nine months, less the period already served under the immediate suspension order. The court made no ruling on the relevance of interim suspensions imposed before a final hearing.

• Professional Conduct Committee: found misconduct, impaired fitness to practise and directed nine months’ suspension, together with immediate suspension.
• High Court (Administrative Court): dismissed the challenges to the sanction and its duration, but allowed the ancillary challenge to consecutive operation of the immediate and final suspension periods.