BC, R (on the application of) v Surrey County Council

Under section 20 of the Children Act 1989, a local authority must provide accommodation immediately where a child in need appears to require it because the person caring for the child is prevented, for whatever reason, from providing suitable accommodation or care.

Temporary or precarious arrangements, including sofa surfing, do not constitute suitable accommodation merely because they are caring or available for a short period. The duty is unqualified and cannot be avoided by reliance on resources, another statutory scheme or another authority. A local authority may itself provide accommodation where it plays a central role in facilitating and maintaining the arrangement. Failure to recognise the duty may constitute a continuing breach.

BC, aged 17, became homeless after being excluded from his family home. Surrey County Council had extensive prior knowledge of his vulnerabilities and family circumstances, but did not provide accommodation under section 20 of the Children Act 1989. Instead, it supported his temporary stay with a friend’s mother and later closed his case.

BC sought judicial review, contending that Surrey owed him accommodation and leaving-care duties, or should exercise its discretion to treat him as if he had been looked after. The central issues were whether the section 20 duty arose, whether Surrey’s involvement meant that the friend’s mother’s accommodation was provided by the authority, whether BC acquired qualifying young person status, and whether delay barred the claim.

1. Section 20 duty. The structured questions identified in R (G) v Southwark LBC [2009] 1 WLR 1299 were applicable. BC was a child within Surrey’s area and was a child in need. His sofa-surfing arrangement was unstable, precarious and unsuitable. His parents were prevented from providing suitable accommodation or care, whatever the precise cause of the family breakdown. By 18 September 2019 Surrey owed him the duty under section 20(1)(c) of the Children Act 1989.
2. The court applied the ordinary judicial review standard to the question whether BC appeared to require accommodation. Although suitability ordinarily involved the authority’s expert judgment, the undisputed facts enabled the court to conclude that no reasonable authority could regard the proposed caravan or the friend’s home as suitable or reliably available.
3. The section 20 duty was immediate and unqualified. It could not be resisted because of lack of resources, reliance on another power, or the availability of accommodation under a different statutory scheme.
4. Accommodation provided by Surrey. A local authority need not provide accommodation itself, but must have facilitated the arrangement or played a role in securing it. Surrey’s involvement became central by 17 October 2019. It assessed the arrangement, liaised with the parents and the friend’s mother, arranged meetings, planned suitable housing options, and collected BC from hospital and returned him to the accommodation. The arrangements on and after that date were therefore made pursuant to section 20.
5. Because BC was accommodated by the authority while still a child, he acquired the status of a person qualifying for advice and assistance under section 24(1B) of the Children Act 1989. The precise services owed were left for agreement or, if necessary, further determination.
6. The challenge was not barred by delay. Surrey’s failure to treat BC as looked after was a continuing state of affairs and breach. In any event, BC had good reasons for delay, including homelessness, ill-health, lack of legal knowledge and difficulties obtaining disclosure. Permission was granted and the claim allowed to the extent stated in the declarations.

First-instance judicial review proceedings. No prior appellate decision is stated in the judgment.