Dr Theodore Piepenbrock v London School of Economics and Political Science & Ors

Permission is required to serve proceedings out of the jurisdiction where none of the applicable exceptions applies. A claimant seeking permission must establish a good arguable case on a jurisdictional gateway and a serious issue to be tried on the merits. Permission and an extension of time should be refused where the pleaded claims are bound to fail.

The court’s common-law power to protect anonymity is not confined by the territorial application of the European Convention on Human Rights. The court may restrict disclosure where this is necessary in the interests of justice, following a fact-specific balancing exercise between open justice, fairness and the legitimate interests of others.

The claimant brought proceedings against the London School of Economics and Political Science, its officers, Associated Newspapers Limited and others. The Ninth Defendant, formerly an LSE graduate teaching assistant resident in the United States, was sued principally in harassment and discrimination.

The claimant emailed the claim form to the Ninth Defendant and sent documents to addresses in the United States, but did not obtain permission to serve out of the jurisdiction or comply with the procedural requirements for service without permission. He applied for an extension of time. The Ninth Defendant sought a declaration that the court had no jurisdiction and opposed an application to set aside an anonymity order.

The issues were whether permission to serve out was required and should be granted, whether time for service should be extended, whether the claims were totally without merit, and whether the Ninth Defendant’s anonymity should continue.

1. Service out. The claim form had not been validly served. Service by post or email did not comply with the requirements for service out, and the claimant had neither permission nor the notice required when relying on service without permission.
2. CPR 6.33(2) did not apply because the claims were not employment-contract claims within sections 15A–15E of the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982, and the Ninth Defendant was not the claimant’s employer. CPR 6.33(2B) did not apply because there was no contract between the claimant and the Ninth Defendant and no basis for extending the claimant’s jurisdiction clause to her personal conduct. CPR 6.33(3) did not apply because no enactment conferred jurisdiction over the relevant claims despite the defendant and conduct being outside the jurisdiction.
3. Permission was therefore required. The claimant failed to establish a good arguable case under the proposed gateways in paragraph 3.1 of Practice Direction 6B. In any event, the claims did not present a serious issue to be tried. The harassment allegations concerning events in the United States were statute-barred, outside the territorial scope of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997, and precluded by issue estoppel. The allegations concerning publication were also statute-barred, incapable of amounting to harassment by publication, or based on the same barred events. The allegation concerning the witness statement was barred by witness immunity. The Equality Act 2010 claim was statute-barred, issue-estopped and outside Part 3.
4. The claims against the Ninth Defendant were hopeless and were certified as totally without merit. No extension of time was granted, and a declaration was made that the court had no jurisdiction because the claim form had not been validly served.
5. Anonymity. The court’s common-law jurisdiction and CPR 39.2(4) permitted anonymity and consequential reporting restrictions independently of any Article 8 right enjoyed by the Ninth Defendant. The court had to balance open justice against fairness, the effective administration of justice and the legitimate interests of others.
6. The claimant had pursued a prolonged campaign of vilification, had repeatedly recycled allegations rejected or unsupported in earlier proceedings, and had used litigation documents misleadingly. There was a strong risk that disclosure would facilitate further abuse of the justice system and harassment. Those factors outweighed the open justice principle. The application to set aside the anonymity order was dismissed, and the order was continued indefinitely, subject to any future application based on a material change of circumstances.

First-instance decision. The judgment refers to earlier High Court, Employment Tribunal and Employment Appeal Tribunal proceedings, but this decision itself was not an appeal.