Yacht Management Company Limited v Lindsay Gordon & Anor

The territorial reach of employment protection legislation depends on the employment relationship as a whole, not solely on the place where work on a vessel is performed. For a peripatetic employee, the tribunal must determine the employee’s base by a multi-factor assessment of the practical operation of the contract.

A seafarer’s base need not be a port, office or employer’s headquarters. It may be the employee’s home if that is the place from which contractual duties begin and end. An agreed reference to tours of duty may, in context, mean only work undertaken on the vessel and need not encompass all contractual duties, including employer-funded travel to and from the vessel.

The claimant lived in Aberdeen and worked as a second stewardess on a super-yacht managed by the appellant, a Guernsey company. The vessel did not enter United Kingdom waters or a United Kingdom port during her employment. Her contract was governed by English law, provided for the jurisdiction of the courts of England and Wales, and required the employer to meet her travel costs between Aberdeen and the vessel.

After dismissal for redundancy, she brought claims under the Employment Rights Act 1996 and the Equality Act 2010. The Employment Tribunal held that it had territorial jurisdiction because her base was in Great Britain. The employer appealed, contending that the agreed fact that her tours of duty began and ended outside Great Britain precluded that conclusion, and that the Tribunal had misapplied the authorities on seafarers’ bases.

1. Appeal dismissed. The Employment Tribunal was entitled to hold that the claimant’s base was in Great Britain and that her statutory claims fell within the territorial reach of the relevant employment legislation.

2. International jurisdiction and territorial jurisdiction are distinct questions. The appeal proceeded on the basis that international jurisdiction was not disputed. The only issue determined was the territorial reach of the statutes relied on.

3. The territorial inquiry required a full assessment of the factual matrix and of how the contract operated in practice. The categories identified in Lawson assist that inquiry but are not exhaustive. For a peripatetic employee, the important question is whether the employee is based in Great Britain.

4. The agreed expression “tours of duty” was not synonymous with all duties under the contract. Read in context, it referred to the claimant’s work on the vessel during voyages. Her annual salary, paid leave, contractual hours, employer-funded travel and obligation to comply with instructions supported the conclusion that travel between Aberdeen and the vessel formed part of her working time and contractual duties. The Tribunal could therefore find that her duties began and ended at her home.

5. The Tribunal also permissibly relied on the claimant’s United Kingdom bank account, tax position, governing-law and jurisdiction clauses, redundancy calculation, and employer-funded travel. Those matters provided an ample basis for finding that her base was in Great Britain.

6. The ratio of Windstar was correctly applied. A seafarer’s base need not be a port, office or headquarters and may be remote from the vessel. There is no legal objection to a home being the base where, on the facts, it is the place from which duties begin and end. Fleet Maritime Services was consistent with that conclusion once its use of “tour of duty” as synonymous with duties was recognised.

• Employment Appeal Tribunal: appeal dismissed: [2024] EAT 33 .
• Employment Tribunal at Aberdeen: in a reserved judgment dated 11 November 2022, Employment Judge Hendry held that the Tribunal had jurisdiction to determine all of the claimant’s claims.