Stena Drilling PTE Limited v Tristan Smith

International jurisdiction and the territorial reach of employment legislation are separate issues. In proceedings concerning an individual employment contract, international jurisdiction must be established through Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982, sections 15C or 15D. Rules governing territorial reach cannot supply an alternative basis.

For unfair-dismissal claims by mariners, section 199(7) requires the reality of where the employee worked, rather than contractual possibilities. Where that provision does not apply, territorial reach remains governed by the fact-sensitive Lawson/Ravat analysis. An express choice-of-law clause is relevant, but its practical operation determines its weight.

The claimant, a seafarer resident in Liverpool, was employed by the Singapore-incorporated appellant from 30 June 2021 until his dismissal in October 2021. He undertook no work under that final contract because he was absent through ill health. He brought claims under the Employment Rights Act 1996 and the Equality Act 2010.

The Employment Judge held that the tribunal had jurisdiction over both claims. The employer appealed, contending that the Judge had conflated international jurisdiction with territorial jurisdiction and had also erred concerning the statutory provisions for mariners and seafarers.

The central issues were whether international jurisdiction could be established under section 15C of the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982, and whether the relevant employment statutes had territorial reach.

1. Appeal allowed. The Employment Judge materially erred by treating territorial-jurisdiction rules as alternative routes to international jurisdiction. International jurisdiction and territorial reach are distinct questions, and an employment-contract claim can obtain international jurisdiction only through sections 15C and 15D of the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982.

2. The Judge correctly rejected section 15C(2)(a) and (b), but did not address section 15C(2)(c) adequately. The evidence concerning the Aberdeen-based HR company, SDHR, raised a possible issue whether Aberdeen was the place where the business which engaged the claimant was situated. Further fact-finding was therefore required. An outstanding argument under section 15C(7) also remained available.

3. The Judge erred in applying section 199(7) of the Employment Rights Act 1996. The statutory question is whether the employee did work wholly outside Great Britain under the contract, not where he might have been required to work. On the findings, territorial jurisdiction over the unfair-dismissal claim could arise only under the Lawson/Ravat principles.

4. The Judge’s treatment of the contractual choice of Singapore law contained errors, including reliance on provisions applicable only where no express choice had been made. Those errors were not material. He was entitled to assess the employment relationship as it operated in reality, and to conclude that Singapore law had played no real practical role. His conclusion on territorial reach of the ERA claim was therefore unaffected.

5. The Judge also erred in relying on regulation 3 of the Equality Act 2010 (Work on Ships and Hovercraft) Regulations 2011, having found that the claimant did not work wholly or partly in the United Kingdom. The EqA territorial issue required reconsideration if international jurisdiction were established.

6. The judgment of 12 July 2022 was set aside. The case was remitted to the same Employment Judge to determine international jurisdiction and, if necessary, territorial jurisdiction over the EqA claim.

• Employment Appeal Tribunal: allowed the employer's appeal in [2024] EAT 57, set aside the tribunal judgment, and remitted specified jurisdiction issues to the same Employment Judge.

• Employment Tribunal: Employment Judge J M Hendry held, in reasons dated 12 July 2022 following a preliminary hearing on 10 June 2022, that the tribunal had jurisdiction over the ERA and EqA claims.