Martin Groom v Maritime and Coastguard Agency

The Employment Appeal Tribunal allowed the appellant's appeal and held that the Employment Tribunal erred in law in concluding that there was no contract at all between the Maritime and Coastguard Agency and its volunteer Coastguard Rescue Officers. Applying the statutory definition of a worker (section 13(1)(a) Employment Relations Act 1999 read with section 230 Employment Rights Act 1996), the EAT held that a contract for the provision of services arose when a volunteer attended an activity for which the documents created an entitlement to remuneration.

The court found key errors in the Tribunal's approach: it placed undue weight on the labels 'volunteer' and on the administrative fact that payment required a claim; it misapplied the volunteer authorities (notably Grayson) by treating them as establishing a sui generis non-contractual status for volunteers; and it mischaracterised payments as mere expense reimbursement rather than hourly remuneration. The EAT substituted a decision that the appellant was a worker when attending activities attracting remuneration, while leaving open the question of status in respect of non-remunerated activities.

This appeal concerned whether a long-serving volunteer Coastguard Rescue Officer (CRO) was a Limb (b) worker for the purposes of the right to be accompanied at disciplinary hearings under sections 10 and 11 of the Employment Relations Act 1999. The Employment Tribunal had held at a preliminary hearing that there was no contract between the parties and therefore no worker status. The appellant appealed to the Employment Appeal Tribunal.

Background and procedural posture:

• The respondent is the Maritime and Coastguard Agency which operates the Coastguard Rescue Service made up of volunteer CROs and Station Officers.
• The appellant was a CRO (and later Station Officer) whose membership was later terminated following disciplinary proceedings; he claimed the right to be accompanied at the disciplinary hearing.
• The Employment Tribunal (Employment Judge Cadney, preliminary hearing) found no contract and dismissed the limb (b) worker claim; the appellant appealed to the EAT.

Issues framed by the court:

• Whether there was a contract at all between the parties, and if so whether it was a contract to provide work or services satisfying the statutory test for a Limb (b) worker.
• Whether payments described in the documents were remuneration or mere expense reimbursement.
• Whether the Tribunal properly applied authority on volunteers (including Grayson) and correctly assessed mutuality of obligation and control.

Court's reasoning and conclusions:

• The EAT reiterated the statutory test for a worker (section 13(1)(a) Employment Relations Act 1999 and section 230(3) Employment Rights Act 1996) and the analytical approach in Uber and subsequent authorities separating (i) whether a contract exists and (ii) whether it is a contract to provide services.
• The EAT rejected the proposition that volunteer arrangements are a sui generis category automatically outside contract law. The legal status of volunteers depends on the particular terms and factual matrix.
• The Tribunal erred in placing weight on (a) the use of the word 'volunteer', (b) the administrative requirement that a CRO submit a claim to be paid, and (c) the fact that some CROs did not claim in practice. Those features did not negate a contractual right to remuneration set out in the documents.
• The detailed remuneration document expressly provided for hourly-rate "Remuneration Claims" distinct from expense claims; the payments were therefore remuneration and not mere expense reimbursement.
• On proper construction the documents created a contract when a CRO attended an activity for which remuneration was payable. The EAT substituted a decision that the appellant was a worker when attending such remunerated activities. The question of worker status for non-remunerated activities was left open for the Tribunal.

The EAT therefore allowed the appeal and substituted a finding of worker status in respect of remunerated activities.

Appeal allowed. The Employment Tribunal erred in law in concluding there was no contract between the parties. On proper construction of the Volunteer Handbook, Code of Conduct and the detailed remuneration document, a contract for the provision of services arises when a CRO attends an activity for which the documents create an entitlement to remuneration. The appellant therefore was a Limb (b) worker when attending activities attracting remuneration. The question of status in relation to non-remunerated activities remains open.

Appeal from the Employment Tribunal (Employment Judge Cadney sitting alone at a preliminary hearing) where the Tribunal held that, on construction of the Volunteer Handbook and Code of Conduct, there was no contract between the parties and the claimant was not a Limb (b) worker. The Employment Appeal Tribunal allowed the appeal and substituted a decision that the claimant was a worker when attending activities attracting remuneration. Neutral citation: [2024] EAT 71.