Alexander Lewis-Ranwell v G4S Health Services (UK) Ltd & Ors

The illegality defence does not bar a negligence claim by a claimant who committed an unlawful act while insane and was found not guilty by reason of insanity. The relevant consistency principle concerns criminal responsibility, not merely the actus reus of a crime. A protective hospital or restriction order is not punishment. Although public confidence, NHS resources and deterrence are relevant, they do not outweigh the public interest in compensating a person who lacked knowledge that the act was wrong and had no moral culpability. The distinction between insanity and diminished responsibility is legally material. The appeal was dismissed and the negligence claim could proceed.

The claimant, who had schizophrenia, was twice released from police detention while allegedly seriously psychotic and dangerous. Shortly after the second release he killed three men. He brought negligence and human-rights claims against healthcare providers and Devon County Council.

The defendants applied to strike out the negligence claims on the basis of ex turpi causa. Garnham J dismissed the applications: [2022] EWHC 1213 (QB). The human-rights claim was conceded to be unaffected by the defence. The central issue on appeal was whether illegality barred a negligence claim by a person found not guilty by reason of insanity.

Majority

1. The appeal was dismissed. The pleaded negligence claims could proceed, subject to unresolved issues of breach, causation, contributory negligence and quantum.
2. The consistency principle identified in Gray v Thames Trains Ltd [2009] UKHL 33 and Henderson v Dorset Healthcare University NHS Foundation Trust [2020] UKSC 43 concerns criminal responsibility for the relevant act. A person found not guilty by reason of insanity is not criminally responsible. The fact that the person committed the actus reus of homicide, or acted deliberately, does not by itself engage that principle.
3. Insanity is no defence to civil liability where the defendant’s mind directed the relevant act; only complete automatism ordinarily avoids liability: Morriss v Marsden [1952] 1 All ER 925 and Dunnage v Randall [2015] EWCA Civ 673. That rule does not create incoherence when the mentally ill person is instead claiming damages from a negligent third party. The two questions concern different liabilities and different compensatory interests.
4. The court applied the public-policy approach to illegality described in Patel v Mirza [2016] UKSC 42, while recognising the continuing importance of authority dealing with particular categories of case. In an insanity case, the public-confidence principle did not justify denial of the claim. A person who did not know that the act was wrong lacks the moral culpability which ordinarily supports the defence.
5. NHS resources and the possible general deterrent effect of a rule that unlawful killing never pays were relevant considerations. They were insufficient to outweigh the claimant’s interest in compensation. The criminal-law distinction between diminished responsibility and insanity is real and may determine the application of the defence.

Dissent

Andrews LJ would have allowed the appeal. In her view, the killings were deliberate unlawful torts for which civil liability attached notwithstanding the absence of criminal responsibility. The claimant’s reliance on those tortious acts as necessary ingredients of his negligence claim made denial of recovery proportionate and consistent with the public-policy considerations identified in Henderson.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division) — appeal dismissed by majority: [2024] EWCA Civ 138.
• High Court of Justice, King’s Bench Division — Garnham J dismissed the defendants’ strike-out applications: [2022] EWHC 1213 (QB).