Simon Pipe v Coventry Higher Education

For a claim under section 15 of the Equality Act 2010, a disability-related factor cannot cause unfavourable treatment where an independent and decisive absence of a business case meant that the claimant would have received the same treatment as a non-disabled person. The precise causation formulation is then immaterial. The same factual conclusion may defeat an indirect discrimination claim under section 19, although its statutory test differs. For justification under sections 15(1)(b) and 19(2)(d), an Employment Tribunal may treat the proportionality of a general promotion framework as a legitimate proxy for the proportionality of its application. It need not separately articulate every individual impact where that approach is lawfully adopted.

The appellant, a university lecturer with ADHD and a sleep disorder, unsuccessfully applied three times for promotion under the university’s promotion framework. He also sought promotion outside the ordinary process as a reasonable adjustment. He brought claims under the Equality Act 2010 for discrimination arising from disability, indirect disability and age discrimination, and failure to make reasonable adjustments.

The Employment Tribunal dismissed the claims. The Employment Appeal Tribunal allowed the appeal in part and remitted claims concerning indirect disability and age discrimination arising from events in 2020, but dismissed the remainder. The appeal to the Court of Appeal concerned that remaining part and raised issues of causation, disadvantage and proportionality.

1. Disposition. Lady Justice Elisabeth Laing gave the leading judgment, with Moylan LJ and Bean LJ agreeing. The appeal was dismissed on all four grounds.
2. Discrimination arising from disability. The Employment Tribunal was entitled to find that the promotion framework required a business case for the proposed grade 7 role and that no such case existed in any relevant year. The evidence supported those findings. The absence of a business case was a decisive obstacle. A non-disabled applicant would have encountered the same obstacle, so there was no room for anything arising from the appellant’s disability to cause the unfavourable treatment. The precise causation test was therefore immaterial on these facts. The Tribunal’s additional reasoning was difficult to follow, but its core conclusion was sound and did not disclose an error of law or perversity.
3. Indirect discrimination. The statutory tests under sections 15 and 19 of the Equality Act 2010 are different. On these facts, however, the absence of a business case made the other requirements of the framework causally irrelevant. The indirect discrimination ground therefore failed as well.
4. Justification. The Tribunal’s finding that the university had not breached the duty to make reasonable adjustments was a relevant foundation for its proportionality analysis. Where treatment results directly from applying a general policy, whether the treatment is justified may depend on whether the policy is justified. That principle, recognised in Buchanan v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [2016] IRLR 918, was applicable here. The reasoning in Seldon v Clarkson Wright and Jakes [2012] UKSC 16; [2012] ICR 716 supported treating the proportionality of the framework as a legitimate proxy for the proportionality of its application. The Tribunal therefore did not err by failing separately to factor in every individual effect on the appellant.
5. The grounds concerning proportionality under sections 15(1)(b) and 19(2)(d) were dismissed.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division) — The appeal was dismissed on all four grounds: [2024] EWCA Civ 191.
2. Employment Appeal Tribunal — The appeal from the Employment Tribunal was allowed in part. Claims concerning indirect disability and age discrimination based on events in 2020 were remitted; the remainder of the appeal was dismissed.
3. Employment Tribunal (England and Wales) — The appellant’s claims under the Equality Act 2010 were dismissed.